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RECONCILING FEDERAL CIRCUIT CHOICE OF
LAW WITH EBAY V. MERCEXCHANGE’S
ABROGATION OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
IRREPARABLE HARM IN COPYRIGHT
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS
Erin V. Klewin*
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. did more than establish the four-factor test that
courts must utilize when determining whether to grant permanent
injunctions for patent infringement. It also spawned a movement among
lower courts to abandon the judicially created and sometimes-criticized
practice of presuming the most important factor of the injunction analysis—
irreparable harm—upon a showing of patent or copyright infringement.
Over the past several decades, presuming such harm routinely permitted
courts to automatically grant preliminary injunctions once a plaintiff
proved a likelihood of success on the merits. This practice contrasted
sharply with the historical nature of preliminary injunctions as
“extraordinary” relief, which rested the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
In Jacobsen v. Katzer, the Federal Circuit became the first circuit to
directly address eBay’s potential application to preliminary injunctions in
the copyright context. The Jacobsen court declined to invoke eBay’s
standards, and instead applied the Ninth Circuit’s pre-eBay presumption of
irreparable harm, as Federal Circuit precedent requires application of
regional circuit law to copyright matters. This ruling contrasted with every
circuit to subsequently confront the issue, including the Ninth Circuit,
which effectively overruled the very presumption that the Jacobsen court
utilized. This Note posits that the Jacobsen court erred in enforcing the
presumption in a post-eBay landscape to begin with, as eBay indeed
abrogated the presumption of irreparable harm as applied to copyright
preliminary injunctions. Further, it urges the Federal Circuit to apply
eBay’s holding in future copyright cases where the regional circuit has not
directly addressed the presumption’s post-eBay vitality.
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INTRODUCTION
The preliminary injunction has long been touted as an “extraordinary”
measure that no person has an automatic right to receive.1 To obtain
preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party has the burden of proving
four factors,2 the most important being that irreparable harm will occur
absent an injunction.3 However, over the past several decades, courts have
routinely granted such extraordinary relief in the patent and copyright
contexts by presuming irreparable harm once a plaintiff proved the first
factor, a likelihood of success on the merits,4 rather than requiring the
plaintiff to prove such harm. Although this sometimes-criticized5 judicial
practice contrasted with the historically “extraordinary” nature of
preliminary injunctions,6 courts justified copyright and patent’s special
treatment by pointing to the nature of intangible property: the holder’s
fundamental right to exclude made any infringement of this right not
compensable by money damages, and thus automatically caused irreparable

1. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
2. These factors are: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the likelihood of
irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted, (3) the balance of the harms between
plaintiff and defendant, and (4) whether an injunction is in the public interest. See Winter v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (citing Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 679–
80 (2008); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987); Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)).
3. See infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text; see also Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 312
(“The Court has repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has
always been irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”). Irreparable harm
results when a party cannot be made whole by monetary damages. See infra notes 84–86 and
accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 101–13, 114, 121–23 and accompanying text; see also Sole v.
Wyner, 551 U.S. 74, 84 (2007) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, the court is called upon
to assess the probability of the plaintiff’s ultimate success on the merits.”). In copyright and
patent law, a likelihood of success on the merits, or prima facie infringement, is established
by a clear showing of patent or copyright validity and infringement. See, e.g., Entm’t
Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997)
(copyright); Polymer Techs., Inc. v. Bridwell, 103 F.3d 970, 973 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (patent).
5. See 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:44 (2011) (describing the
presumption as a “lamentable feature of copyright law” that has been “profoundly
misunderstood and misapplied”).
6. See infra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. Compare Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520
U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,
one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.”), with BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (9th ed. 2009) (“A presumption shifts
the burden of . . . persuasion to the opposing party, who can then attempt to overcome the
presumption.”).
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harm.7 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, recently cast such reasoning
into serious doubt in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,8 in which it
reversed the Federal Circuit’s practice of automatically granting permanent
injunctions9 upon a finding of patent infringement.10 Rather, the eBay
Court held that plaintiffs seeking such relief must instead prove each
element of a similar four-factor test.11
District courts disagreed over whether eBay’s standard and its effect on
the presumption of irreparable harm applied to the grant of preliminary
injunctions in the copyright context.12 In Jacobsen v. Katzer,13 the Federal
Circuit had the opportunity to address this issue directly. Although three
circuit courts had previously applied eBay’s factors to permanent
injunctions for copyright infringement,14 the Federal Circuit disregarded
eBay and directed the district court to apply the Ninth Circuit’s pre-eBay
presumption of irreparable harm to its determination of whether to issue
preliminary injunctive relief.15 While the Jacobsen court’s professed
application of regional circuit law to non-patent issues appeared to follow
standard Federal Circuit choice-of-law precedent,16 this case was anything
but standard:
intervening Supreme Court precedent in eBay was
irreconcilable with regional circuit law, and the Federal Circuit did not
adequately address it.
After the Jacobsen ruling, the death of the presumption of irreparable
harm in the copyright preliminary injunction context became increasingly
apparent. First, the Supreme Court established in Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.17 that, in accordance with traditional
equitable principles, plaintiffs must prove a “likelihood” of irreparable
injury to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, declaring that a “possibility”
of such harm was insufficient.18 Winter essentially clarified that the
principles set forth in eBay also applied to preliminary injunctions, and
7. See infra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
8. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
9. Permanent injunctions are granted after a final hearing on the merits, and require the
plaintiff to prove actual success, as opposed to a likelihood of success on the merits. See
infra note 80 and accompanying text.
10. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94.
11. Id. at 391 (“A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the
plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”); cf. supra note 2 and accompanying text
(describing the traditional four-factor test for preliminary injunctions).
12. See infra Part II.C.2.
13. 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
14. See CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008); Peter Letterese &
Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir.
2008); Christopher Phelps & Assoc., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
15. See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1378, 1383.
16. The Federal Circuit lacks subject matter jurisdiction over copyright claims, and
established precedent requires application of the law of the regional circuit from which the
copyright claim originates. See infra Part I.A.2.
17. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
18. Id. at 22.

2012]

IRREPARABLE HARM AND COPYRIGHT

2117

shifted the burden of persuasion squarely back on the plaintiff.19 Following
Winter, three circuit courts not only applied eBay’s four factors to
preliminary injunctions in the copyright context, but also explicitly held that
courts should not presume irreparable harm once a plaintiff has
demonstrated prima facie infringement. 20 Ironically, one of these circuits
was the Ninth Circuit, which effectively overruled the very presumption
upon which Jacobsen had relied. 21
Numerous scholars have posited that the presumption of irreparable harm
does not survive eBay in the copyright preliminary injunction context.22
However, none have addressed how the Federal Circuit, with its unique
choice-of-law rules applying regional circuit law to copyright matters,23
should confront eBay’s effect on the presumption in cases where the
regional circuit has not directly spoken on the issue. This Note addresses
whether the Federal Circuit in Jacobsen should have applied eBay to the
copyright preliminary injunction motion at hand and rejected the
presumption of irreparable harm. Despite uncertainty with respect to
eBay’s appropriate application at the time of Jacobsen, 24 the passage of
time has significantly clarified eBay’s abrogation of the presumption in the
copyright preliminary injunction context.25 The Federal Circuit should no
longer apply the outdated presumption in the spirit of unwaveringly
following regional circuit precedent when intervening Supreme Court law is
clearly irreconcilable with such precedent. 26 Therefore, this Note urges the
Federal Circuit to construe unsettled regional circuit law as rejecting the
presumption of irreparable harm in the copyright preliminary injunction
19. See infra Part III.B.1.
20. See Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm’t Corp., No. 11-1860, 2011 WL
5084587, at *2–3 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 2011) (per curiam); Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc., v.
Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Google, Inc. (Perfect 10 III), 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W.
3366 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2012) (No. 11-704); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d. Cir. 2010).
21. See Flexible Lifeline, 654 F.3d at 998; Perfect 10 III, 653 F.3d at 981; cf. Jacobsen,
535 F.3d at 1378.
22. See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 14.06[A][5][a][ii] (2011); 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:44; Richard Dannay, Copyright
Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter Ebay—Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-Factor Freedom?, 55
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 449, 460 (2008); Pamela Samuelson & Krzysztof Bebenek, Why
Plaintiffs Should Have to Prove Irreparable Harm in Copyright Preliminary Injunction
Cases, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 67 (2010); John M. Newman, Note, Raising the Bar
and the Public Interest:
On Prior Restraints, “Traditional Contours,” and
Constitutionalizing Preliminary Injunctions in Copyright Law, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J.
323, 359 (2011). Contra Aaron T. Dozeman, Note, Salinger and Ebay: When Equitable
Considerations Undermine Exclusivity, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 323,
324 (2011); Andrew F. Spillane, Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Presumption of
Irreparable Harm in Copyright Cases, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 257, 259 (2011).
23. See infra Part I.A.1.
24. See infra Part II.C.1–2.
25. See infra Part III.B.1–2.
26. See 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3506
(3d ed. 2008) (explaining general circuit court practice that circuits are not bound by
previous decisions when “an intervening decision by the Supreme Court . . . casts doubt on
the prior ruling or perhaps if newly emergent authority, even though not directly controlling,
offers a convincing reason for believing that the earlier panel would change its course”).
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context where the regional circuit has not directly addressed the
presumption’s vitality after eBay.
Part I of this Note provides a foundation on Federal Circuit jurisdiction,
and describes patent and copyright preliminary injunctions. Part II analyzes
eBay and its effect on patent and copyright injunctions leading up to the
Federal Circuit’s Jacobsen decision. Part III then focuses on Jacobsen and
courts’ subsequent rejection of the presumption of irreparable harm in a
variety of contexts. Finally, Part IV contends that the Jacobsen court
erroneously failed to apply the eBay standard to copyright preliminary
injunctions, and offers guidance to the Federal Circuit on addressing the
presumption in future copyright cases.
This Note concludes that, if faced with a copyright preliminary injunction
case in a circuit that previously applied the presumption but that has not
directly addressed its continuing vitality after eBay, the Federal Circuit
should interpret such unsettled regional law by reasonably predicting that
the circuit will reject the presumption as inconsistent with eBay. Such a
holding aligns with relevant case law and advances important policy goals,
including efficient utilization of court resources, avoidance of intercircuit
conflict, and preservation of the extraordinary nature of preliminary
injunctive relief.
I. FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTION AND AN OVERVIEW OF PATENT
AND COPYRIGHT INJUNCTIONS PRIOR TO EBAY
Part I begins by discussing the unique subject matter jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit, which permits jurisdiction over copyright matters that are
attached to patent claims, and a choice-of-law policy that applies regional
circuit law to these pendent copyright matters. Next, it provides
background on preliminary injunctive relief, focusing on its historical
nature as an extraordinary remedy. It concludes by examining courts’
widespread practice, in the copyright and patent injunction context, of
presuming irreparable harm once a plaintiff showed a likelihood of success
on the merits, a presumption that eBay called into doubt.
A. The Federal Circuit: Copyright Jurisdiction and Choice-of-Law Rules
In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Courts Improvement Act27
(FCIA), which created a thirteenth federal appellate court—the Federal
Circuit. This court functions similarly to its twelve sister circuits, except
for one important difference: its jurisdiction is based on subject matter
rather than geography. 28 This includes sole jurisdiction over patent
appeals, 29 but also exclusive jurisdiction over pendent matters attached to a
27. Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
28. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 3 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 13; H.R. REP.
NO. 97-312, at 18 (1981).
29. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 7 (noting consolidation of the Court of Claim and Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20. The Federal Circuit also
exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction in several other areas that this Note will not

2012]

IRREPARABLE HARM AND COPYRIGHT

2119

patent claim. 30 While this permits the Federal Circuit to hear appeals of
pendent copyright claims, such as the one in Jacobsen discussed later in this
Note, the circuit has adopted a policy of applying regional circuit law to
such matters. This section examines the jurisdiction and choice-of-law
rules governing copyright matters in the Federal Circuit.
1. Jurisdiction over Pendent Copyright Claims
The FCIA designated the Federal Circuit as the sole court for patent
appeals in a congressional effort to achieve uniformity in substantive patent
law administration. 31 Congress sought to unify patent appellate jurisdiction
within one court in response to a perception of inefficient management of
patent law in the courts. 32 Congress’s main purposes in allocating sole
jurisdiction over patent issues to the Federal Circuit was thus to develop
clearer patent doctrine and prevent forum shopping among the regional
circuits. 33 Its patent jurisdiction includes appeals from the U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office and district court cases arising under the patent laws, and
comprises almost half of its caseload.34 Its jurisdiction is not restricted to
appeals of final decisions, but extends to interlocutory appeals from district
courts. 35
The Federal Circuit has established exclusive jurisdiction over pendent
matters that are attached to a patent claim, including copyright claims.36
Through September 16, 2011, 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) stated that the Federal
Circuit should exercise this jurisdiction where district court jurisdiction was
based at least in part on patent or plant variety protection laws. 37 Thus, as
address. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 31 (2008) (noting at
least sixteen other areas, including government contracts and federal takings cases); Paul R.
Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012)
(manuscript at 26–27), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1945039.
30. See infra Part I.A.1.
31. ROBERT L. HARMON ET AL., PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 1294 (10th ed.
2011); accord S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2; H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23.
32. H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 22; accord NARD & WAGNER, supra note 29, at 33–34
(describing how varying treatment of patent cases by regional circuits led to forum shopping,
and noting the Supreme Court’s disinterest in managing patent cases due to large dockets
and confusing technological issues).
33. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5; accord H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–22 (explaining that due
to patent law’s history of producing differing results in different courts, “some circuit courts
are regarded as ‘pro-patent’ and other ‘anti-patent,’ and much time and money is expended
in ‘shopping’ for a favorable venue”).
34. See HARMON ET AL., supra note 31, at 1311–12; Gugliuzza, supra note 29
(manuscript at 26).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c) (2006) (stating that the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over “an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree described in subsection (a)
or (b) of this section in any case over which the court would have jurisdiction of an appeal
under section 1295”).
36. HARMON ET AL., supra note 31, at 1308 (citing Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic
Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1572 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam)).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), amended by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284, 331–32 (2011) (providing for Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over appeals from a final decision of a district court if (1) “the jurisdiction of that court was
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the path of appeal was determined by the basis of jurisdiction in the district
court, the Federal Circuit exercised jurisdiction over pendent copyright
claims attached to a patent claim.38 Indeed, this jurisdiction is not nullified
even when the attached patent claims are dismissed with prejudice at the
district court level; if the complaint contained patent infringement claims,
the district court’s jurisdiction arose in part under the patent laws and the
Federal Circuit retains exclusive jurisdiction over all pendent claims.39 As
discussed in Part III, this permitted the Federal Circuit to exercise
jurisdiction over the copyright infringement claim in Jacobsen because the
original complaint also alleged the required patent issue—a claim for
declaratory judgment of non-infringement of a patent.40
The Federal Circuit first declared exclusive jurisdiction over an
interlocutory appeal of a copyright preliminary injunction order in Atari,
Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc.,41 where the court identified several additional
congressional intentions that informed Federal Circuit jurisdiction over a
dispute of this manner.42 The court noted Congress’s goal of avoiding
bifurcated appeals,43 forum shopping,44 specialization of the court,45 and
the Federal Circuit’s appropriation of elements of law not specifically
assigned to it.46 While Congress amended § 1295(a)(1) in 2011 to confer
exclusive Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals of a district court final
decision “in any civil action arising under . . . any Act of Congress relating
based, in whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title” and (2) the case was not “a case
involving a claim arising under any Act of Congress relating to copyrights, exclusive rights
in mask works, or trademarks and no other claims under section 1338(a)”). Section 1338(a)
states that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.” Id.
§ 1338(a).
38. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., 747 F.2d 1422, 1429–30 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal Court over pendent copyright claims),
overruled in part by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir.
1998); accord Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1572 n.9.
39. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1189–90 (Fed. Cir.
2004); accord Zenith Elecs. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
HARMON ET AL., supra note 31, at 1308–09 (discussing in detail the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction to review pendent matters, including copyright, “as long as the case
involves a bona fide patent claim”).
40. See infra notes 196–97 and accompanying text.
41. 747 F.2d 1422.
42. See id. at 1434–35.
43. See id. at 1435–36 (“Congress specifically rejected [the] suggestion that this court
should have only ‘issue’ jurisdiction and that appeals involving patent and non-patent issues
should be bifurcated. . . . Congress’ statement that ‘cases’ will be within the jurisdiction of
this court, and its statement that [Federal Circuit] jurisdiction should be contrasted with the
bifurcated appellate jurisdiction set forth in Coastal States Marketing . . . reflects the intent
of Congress to avoid bifurcation of appeals to this court.” (construing H.R. REP. NO. 97-275,
at 41 (1981))).
44. See id. at 1437–38.
45. See id. at 1436–37 (“‘The proposed new court is not a specialized court.’” (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19)).
46. See id. at 1438 (describing how Congress’s passage of the FCIA despite concerns
that the Federal Circuit might appropriate non-patent issues attached to patent claims was
proof of its faith that the Federal Circuit would not exceed its mandate to rule on substantive
patent law).
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to patents,” 47 it is likely that the amended statute’s language does not
change the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to hear non-patent issues so long as
they are attached to a patent claim. 48
2. Choice-of-Law Approach: Applying Regional Circuit Law
to Copyright Claims
While the Federal Circuit exercised clear jurisdiction over pendent
copyright claims attached to a patent claim, it recognized that a question
remained as to what law should apply to such fields not within the court’s
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.49 In Panduit Corp. v. All States
Plastic Manufacturing Co., 50 the Federal Circuit first articulated its policy
of applying regional circuit law to pendent non-patent issues, 51 including
copyright claims. 52 This choice-of-law approach led the Federal Circuit to
apply regional circuit law specifically to the issuance of preliminary
injunctions in copyright cases, 53 as will be discussed in connection with the
Jacobsen decision. 54
Although not statutorily required to do so, the Federal Circuit has applied
these choice-of-law rules in order “to avoid exacerbating the problem of

47. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19(b), 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)) (providing Federal Circuit jurisdiction “of
an appeal from a final decision of a district court of the United States . . . in any civil action
arising under, or in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim
arising under, any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection”).
48. Compare id., with 28 U.S.C § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (conferring Federal Circuit
jurisdiction over appeals of civil actions in which district court jurisdiction was based at least
in part on patent or plant variety protection laws). It is unclear if the removal of the
language “in whole or in part” has any significance on whether the Federal Circuit can hear
non-patent issues, as, for example, an action for copyright and patent infringement still arises
in part under the patent laws. Because this amendment is new and has not yet been clarified
by the courts, this Note will assume that the Federal Circuit can still hear non-patent issues
over which the district courts have original jurisdiction, so long as the action arose in part
under patent law. This reading is in line with historical Federal Circuit precedent. See, e.g.,
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1572 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam). Further, it seems the amendment was enacted to permit parties to bring compulsory
counterclaims arising under patent law in the Federal Circuit as a response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc. 535 U.S. 826
(2002) (holding that the Federal Circuit did not have appellate jurisdiction over a case in
which the complaint did not allege a claim arising under federal patent law, but the answer
contained a patent-law counterclaim).
49. See Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 909 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(“As to nonpatent matters . . . a significant choice of law question inherently arises.”).
50. 744 F.2d 1564.
51. Id. at 1574–75; accord Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“When the questions on appeal involve law and precedent on subjects
not exclusively assigned to the Federal Circuit, the court applies the law which would be
applied by the regional circuit.”); Bandag, 750 F.2d at 909.
52. See, e.g., Amini Innovation Corp. v. Anthony Cal., Inc. 439 F.3d 1365, 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
53. See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1191 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Atari, 897 F.2d at 1575.
54. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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intercircuit conflicts in non-patent areas”55 and to save district courts from
the confusion of “serving two masters.”56 It also sought to minimize
parties’ incentives to forum shop on non-patent claims,57 in accordance
with congressional intent.58 Because Congress never imposed any
requirement upon the Federal Circuit to clear up intercircuit conflicts with
respect to non-patent matters, the court found this reasoning appropriate.59
Additionally, in Atari, the court held that applying regional circuit law to
non-patent matters allowed it to satisfy congressional intention to avoid
Federal Circuit appropriation of legal fields not exclusively assigned to it.60
However, the court recognized that regional circuit law may not always be
clear, and held that the Federal Circuit should “decide non-patent matters in
light of the problems faced by the district court . . . including the law there
applicable” and “to the extent it can be discerned.”61 Further, where a
regional circuit has not directly spoken on a particular issue, the Federal
Circuit held that it must “reasonably predict how that court would decide
the issue” in light of issues such as the circuit’s district court decisions and
public policy.62
Despite this limiting holding, the Federal Circuit has expanded the realm
to which it applies its own law beyond purely substantive patent issues. In
Midwest Industries, Inc. v. Karavan Trailers，Inc.,63 the court held en
banc64 that it would no longer apply regional circuit law to issues involving
the interplay between patent and non-patent law.65 The court confirmed

55. Bandag, 750 F.2d at 909; accord Panduit, 744 F.2d at 1574 (“[W]e must resolve this
choice of law question by considering the general policy of minimizing confusion and
conflicts in the federal judicial system.”).
56. See Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“It would
be at best unfair to hold in this case that the district court, at risk of error, should have
‘served two masters’, or that it should have looked, Janus-like, in two directions in its
conduct of that judicial process.”), overruled in part by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant
Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
57. Midwest Indus., Inc., v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(en banc); accord Atari, 747 F.2d at 1439.
58. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19–20 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29–30
(“[The Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims] is intended to alleviate the
serious problems of forums [sic] shopping among the regional courts of appeals on patent
claims . . . . It is not intended to create forum shopping opportunities between the Federal
Circuit and the regional courts of appeals on other claims.”).
59. Bandag, 750 F.2d at 909 (“No mandate to unify intercircuit conflicts regarding
[nonpatent] matters was given to this court by Congress in its passage of our enabling
legislation . . . .”).
60. Atari, 747 F.2d at 1438.
61. Id. at 1439 (quoting Bandag, 750 F.2d at 909); see id. at 1440 (“[T]he task remains a
challenge, for the path to the established law of the involved circuit may or may not be easily
discernible and clearly marked.”).
62. TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Panduit
Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
63. 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (en banc).
64. To overrule precedent, the Federal Circuit must rule en banc. See George E. Warren
Corp. v. United States, 341 F.3d 1348, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
65. Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1358–60 (“[We] conclude that we should abandon our practice
of applying regional circuit law in resolving questions involving the relationship between
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that Federal Circuit law extends beyond substantive patent law to nonpatent issues that are “affected by the special circumstances of the patent
law setting in which those issues arise.” 66 Applying its own law to such
issues, it asserted, would help fulfill its obligation of promoting uniformity
within patent law, prevent inconsistent lines of authority, and provide other
courts with the benefit of Federal Circuit patent law analysis. 67 The court
thus overruled previous decisions by the Federal Circuit 68 in which it had
applied regional circuit law to patent-related issues that were not
substantive patent law. 69 The circuit now routinely applies its own law to
procedural issues pertaining to patent law, 70 including questions of personal
jurisdiction in patent law cases, 71 non-mutual issue preclusion in patent
cases, 72 and whether a plaintiff has the right to both permanent 73 and
preliminary injunctive relief for patent infringement. 74 As the Federal
Circuit began to apply its own law to the grant of injunctive relief for patent
infringement, it adopted standards from its sister circuits.75 Indeed, it
almost always granted such relief upon a finding of infringement,
borrowing a theory from copyright known as the presumption of irreparable
harm. 76
B. Copyright and Patent Law: The Presumption
of Irreparable Harm Before eBay
This section outlines circuit courts’ legal standards for granting copyright
and patent injunctions before eBay, including the common judicial practice
of presuming irreparable harm once a plaintiff proved a likelihood of
success on the merits. This practice, however, contrasted sharply with the
traditional view of the preliminary injunction as an extraordinary remedy
that no party had an automatic right to receive. 77
patent law and other federal and state law rights. Henceforth, we will apply our own law to
such questions.”).
66. Id. at 1359–60 (holding that Federal Circuit law governs procedural issues not
themselves of substantive patent law if “the issue pertains to patent law, if it bears an
essential relationship to matters committed to our exclusive control by statute, or if it clearly
implicates the jurisprudential responsibilities of this court in a field within its exclusive
jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
67. See id. at 1360–61.
68. See, e.g., Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1032 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (holding that regional circuit law applies in determining whether patent law preempts
particular state law claims), overruled by Midwest, 175 F.3d 1356.
69. Midwest, 175 F.3d at 1359.
70. See, e.g., Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 536 F.3d 1247, 1255 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
71. See Hildenbrand v. Steck Mfg. Co., 279 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
72. See Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 473 F.3d 1196, 1202–03 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
73. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
74. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
75. See Sandoz, 544 F.3d at 1368 (collecting cases to show how “Federal Circuit
precedent [regarding issuing preliminary injunctions] developed to match the rest of the
nation”).
76. See NARD & WAGNER, supra note 29, at 205–06.
77. See infra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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1. What Is a Preliminary Injunction?
An injunction is a court order directing a party to perform or prevent a
specific action.78 While permanent injunctions are granted at the end of a
trial, temporary or “preliminary” injunctions are “issued before or during
trial to prevent an irreparable injury from occurring before the court has a
chance to decide the case.”79 The Supreme Court has emphasized that both
forms of injunctive relief require similar analyses, except that the plaintiff
requesting preliminary relief must also prove a likelihood of success on the
merits of her claim.80 The Court recently confirmed the traditional fourfactor test that courts must apply in determining whether to issue a
preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the
likelihood of irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not granted, (3) the
balance of the harms between plaintiff and defendant, and (4) whether an
injunction is in the public interest.81 The second factor, proof of irreparable
harm, is the most important element of any grant of preliminary injunctive
relief,82 and is often considered a prerequisite to such a grant.83 The
movant has the burden of proving irreparable harm,84 which results when
the movant cannot be adequately compensated by monetary relief85 and
courts find it difficult to calculate losses.86
From its origins in the courts of equity, preliminary injunctions have long
been viewed as providing relief in extraordinary cases,87 and the Supreme

78. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 855.
79. Id.
80. See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32–33 (2008); Amoco
Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (“The standard for a
preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the
exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual
success.”). Permanent injunctions are granted after the plaintiff has already prevailed on the
merits of its claim. See 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions § 11 (2010).
81. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citing Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 679–80 (2008);
Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542; Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)); see
also KIRSTIN STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., INJUNCTIVE RELIEF: TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS
& PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 20 (2009) (noting the test’s origins in equity).
82. See 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:33 n.1 (collecting numerous cases in support).
83. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1987) (The Court has
repeatedly held that the basis for injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been
irreparable injury and the inadequacy of legal remedies.”); see also 6 PATRY, supra note 5,
§ 22:33 (“The absence of an adequate remedy at law is a precondition to equitable relief.”
(quoting Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984)));
accord Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 408 F.3d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that
irreparable harm is the “single most important prerequisite for issuance of a preliminary
injunction”).
84. 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:35.
85. Id. § 22:33.
86. Id. § 22:34.
87. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][1][b] n.14 (collecting cases referring to
preliminary injunctive relief as “extraordinary”); 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22.10 (collecting
cases to describe how the drastic remedy of injunctive relief should be the exception, and not
the rule); STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 81, at 4–5 (describing the narrow limitations
originally put on injunctions in accordance with English law, and U.S. congressional efforts
to limit the use of injunctive relief to extraordinary cases).
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Court has continuously underscored this notion.88 The importance of this
remedy cannot be overstated; as an interlocutory order granting preliminary
injunctive relief frequently puts an end to litigation, it is often the most
important decision in a case. 89 Further, as this remedy is granted when the
factual record is often incomplete,90 commentators have noted that such
relief can potentially lead to erroneous rulings and should not be taken
lightly. 91
Nevertheless, courts are given wide discretion in crafting preliminary
injunctive relief, and a district court’s grant or denial will remain
undisturbed unless there was a clear abuse of discretion. 92 Less than
scrupulous adherence to traditional equitable principles, including the
tendency of courts to presume irreparable harm upon a showing of
likelihood of success of a copyright or patent infringement claim, has made
such “extraordinary” relief much more obtainable in intellectual property
cases over the past several decades.93
2. Copyright Preliminary Injunctions Before eBay
Copyright law owes its origins to the Intellectual Property Clause of the
Constitution, which grants to Congress the power “[t]o promote the
88. See, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (“‘It frequently is
observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that
should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.’” (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 1995))); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542
(1987) (“[A]n injunction is an equitable remedy that does not issue as of course.”);
Weinberger, 456 U.S 305, 311–12 (1982) (collecting cases); City of Harrisonville v. W.S.
Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337–38 (1933) (“[A]n injunction is not a remedy
which issues as of course.”); Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919) (“[An
injunction] should be exercised only where intervention is essential in order effectually to
protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.”); Consol. Canal Co. v. Mesa
Canal Co., 177 U.S. 296, 302 (1900) (“[I]t is familiar law that injunction will not issue to
enforce a right that is doubtful, or to restrain an act the injurious consequences of which are
merely trifling.”).
89. 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:7.
90. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197,
1212 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (“Preliminary injunctions are typically requested when a lawsuit’s
factual development is limited.”); 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:7; Newman, supra note 22, at
325.
91. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][6][c]; 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:7;
Samuelson & Bebenek, supra note 22, at 79; Newman, supra note 22, at 354–55 (citing
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 150 (1998)). But cf. Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556
F. Supp. 2d 310, 319 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A presumption temporarily removing the need
to prove irreparable harm may serve the ends of equity at this early stage of the litigation
even if it would be inappropriate where the record is complete.”).
92. 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:8. Such abuse occurs when a district court bases its
decision on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous facts. See, e.g., Am. Trucking
Ass’ns v. Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
93. 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:13; STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 81, at 10; accord
4 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][1][b]; see also Lemley & Volokh, supra note 91, at
150 (“In copyright cases . . . preliminary injunctions are granted pretty much as a matter of
course.”).
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Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”94 Congress enacted the Copyright Act with the utilitarian
purpose of incentivizing the production of new works by granting authors
monopolies on their original works for a limited time.95 The Act grants
copyright holders the exclusive rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute,
perform, and display their works;96 the holder’s right to exclude others from
using the work has been deemed “fundamental and beyond dispute.”97
The current Copyright Act of 1976 authorizes a court to grant
preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent infringement “on such
terms as it may deem reasonable.”98 Courts have held that the main
purpose of preliminary injunctive relief in the copyright context is to
maintain the status quo until the court can reach a final adjudication on the
merits of the claim.99 What constitutes irreparable harm for copyright
infringement is vague at best, but courts have found factors such as the
fleeting market life of a work, imminent financial ruin, and loss of
reputation to satisfy this opaque requirement.100
Prior to eBay, most circuits utilized the traditional four-factor test with
minor variations.101 The Second and Ninth Circuits differed from their
sister circuits in adopting similar two-part tests.102 The Ninth Circuit’s test,
in particular, represented points on a continuum where the required

94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
95. See JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 4, 7 (3d
ed. 2010).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
97. Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Fox
Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006) (“Any court having jurisdiction . . . may . . . grant
temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or
restrain infringement of a copyright.”).
99. See, e.g., 4 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][1][a] (quoting Warner Bros. v. Dae
Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1125 (2d Cir. 1989)); accord 6 PATRY, supra note 5,
§ 22:10 n.5 (collecting cases). But see id. § 22:10 (explaining that preservation of the status
quo is “at best aspirational,” and courts should instead “seek . . . to preserve their ability to
render a meaningful judgment at trial”).
100. See 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:37–41.
101. See id. § 22:21 & n.2 (collecting cases from each circuit); STOLL-DEBELL ET AL.,
supra note 81, at 22–30 (citing each circuit’s test for preliminary injunctions).
102. Compare MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir.
2004) (“A party . . . must demonstrate (1) irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction
and (2) either (a) a likelihood of success on the merits or (b) sufficiently serious questions
going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly in the movant’s favor.”), with LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of
Nev., 434 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[R]elief is available to a party who
demonstrates either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility
of irreparable harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips
in its favor.”). Both tests eliminate the public interest factor and balance the remaining three
elements, with a stronger showing of probable success on the merits reducing the required
showing of irreparable harm or balancing of the hardships. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 91,
at 159 n.49.
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irreparable harm increased as the likelihood of success decreased.103 One
commentator coined the two-part formulation the “predominant test” for
issuance of a copyright preliminary injunction, despite its usage in only two
circuits.104 This is unsurprising, given that the Second and Ninth Circuits
are considered leaders in the copyright field, as they house the
entertainment and publishing capitals of the country,105 and account for
nearly half of all copyright infringement appeals.106 The majority of the
circuits granted copyright preliminary injunctions without analyzing all the
factors; in fact, once a likelihood of success was established, courts
normally presumed irreparable harm.107
The copyright presumption of irreparable harm, which is usually
rebuttable by the defendant,108 first surfaced in a 1968 Second Circuit
decision109 and was adopted gradually by other circuits over the next two
decades.110 Courts justified this presumption by pointing to the intangible
nature of copyright and the inherent difficulty of calculating monetary
103. LGS Architects, 434 F.3d at 1155 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001)).
104. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][2][a].
105. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 95, at 309; Lemley & Volokh, supra note 91, at 161.
106. Newman, supra note 22, at 356 n.198 (describing a recent Westlaw search revealing
that nearly forty-six percent of copyright infringement cases were brought in the Second and
Ninth Circuits, with the remainder being initiated in the other eleven circuits).
107. See, e.g., LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d 1150, 1155–
56 (9th Cir. 2006); MyWebGrocer, LLC v. Hometown Info, Inc., 375 F.3d 190, 192–93 (2d
Cir. 2004); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 206 (3d
Cir. 2003); Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 315 F.3d 1039, 1041–42 (8th Cir.
2003); Country Kids ‘N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288–89 (10th Cir. 1996);
Serv. & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 690 (4th Cir. 1992); Concrete
Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 611–12 (1st Cir. 1988); Forry,
Inc. v. Neundorfer, Inc., 837 F.2d 259, 267 (6th Cir. 1988); Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips
Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 1982); see also 4 NIMMER, supra note
22, § 14.06[A][2][b] & n.51 (collecting cases); 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:44 & nn.5–6
(collecting cases). The District of Columbia Circuit has never approved the presumption,
but several trial courts within the circuit have applied it. See, e.g., Health Ins. Ass’n of Am.
v. Novelli, 211 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2002). In contrast, the Fifth Circuit has expressly
refused to presume irreparable harm upon prima facie infringement, and has required
plaintiffs to prove each element of the test. See, e.g., Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n of Lubbock,
Tex. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1261 (5th Cir. 1987). For a
thorough history of copyright preliminary injunctions in the United States, see also Lemley
& Volokh, supra note 91, at 154–65.
108. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.
2001) (presumption to be rebutted by a fair use defense); Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v.
Avant! Corp., 125 F.3d 824, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he presumption is rebutted where the
plaintiff has not been harmed, where any harm is de minimis, or where the defendant acted
with innocent intent, relying on lack of copyright notice.”); Richard Feiner & Co. v. Turner
Entm’t Co., 98 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (presumption rebutted by plaintiff’s undue delay
in bringing the action). But see Cadence, 125 F.3d at 827 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
adequacy of monetary damages can never rebut the presumption).
109. Am. Metro. Enters. of N.Y., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 389 F.2d 903, 905
(2d Cir. 1968) (“A copyright holder in the ordinary case may be presumed to suffer
irreparable harm when his right to the exclusive use of the copyrighted material is
invaded.”).
110. See 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:49 (noting when the presumption was adopted by
each court).
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damages in copyright cases.111 Due to an infringement’s invasion of the
copyright holder’s right to exclude, the belief was that combating
infringement required injunctive relief to prevent destruction of the
property’s value.112 The practice of presuming harm often collapsed the
four-factor test to one factor: whether the plaintiff demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits.113 In the Second and Ninth Circuits,
presuming irreparable harm essentially reduced each two-part test to one
factor as well, resulting in the issuance of preliminary injunctions in the
leading copyright circuits upon a mere showing of prima facie
infringement.114
3. Patent Preliminary Injunctions Before eBay
Copyright law is not the only field that has adopted the presumption of
irreparable harm in the injunction context. The Federal Circuit also adopted
this presumption with respect to patent law, which serves a similar
utilitarian function to that of copyright: it seeks to stimulate innovation
among society by granting temporary monopolies to inventors.115 As with
copyright, patent owners are granted a property right in their discoveries by
Congress under its constitutionally granted power in the Intellectual
Property Clause.116 The Patent Act authorizes patent holders the exclusive
rights to make, use, offer to sell, or sell their inventions.117 The Act states
that a court “may” grant an injunction “on such terms as the court deems
reasonable.”118

111. Id. § 22:50; see, e.g., Country Kids, 77 F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he financial impact of
copyright infringement is hard to measure and often involves intangible qualities.”);
Concrete Mach. Co., 843 F.2d at 611 (explaining how the commercial value of this
intangible interest is “often fleeting” and “may be lost by the time litigation on the claim is
complete.”). But cf. 6 PATRY, supra note 5, § 22:50 (opining that this rationale “merely
stat[es] a conclusion for the presumption,” and identifies a lack of reasoning over why
copyright’s intangible nature makes calculations of damages difficult).
112. See, e.g., Fashion Victim Ltd. v. Sunrise Turquoise, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1302, 1307
(N.D. Ill. 1992).
113. 4 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][2][c] (noting that in many cases, courts failed
to invoke the balancing of the harms and public interest factors, making a likelihood of
success on the merits the determinative factor); accord Lemley & Volokh, supra note 91, at
158–64. Analysis of the balancing of the harms and public interest factors are beyond the
scope of this Note.
114. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][2][c].
115. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). Compare id., with
supra text accompanying notes 95–97 (discussing the similar goals of copyright law).
116. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266,
1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting copyright’s
origins in the Intellectual Property Clause).
117. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
118. Compare id. § 283 (“The several courts . . . may grant injunctions in accordance
with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such
terms as the court deems reasonable.” (emphasis added)), with 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006)
(“Any court having jurisdiction . . . may . . . grant temporary and final injunctions on such
terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.”
(emphasis added)).
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In accordance with the majority of its sister circuits, 119 the Federal
Circuit has applied the traditional four-part test in determining whether to
grant a preliminary injunction for patent infringement.120 The Federal
Circuit first “lowered the bar”121 for granting preliminary injunctions in
patent cases in Smith International Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co. 122 by expressly
holding that a likelihood of success on the merits raised a presumption of
irreparable harm. 123 Similar to the reasoning courts employed to justify the
presumption in copyright law, 124 the Federal Circuit based this policy on
Indeed, the Smith court
the patent holder’s right to exclude. 125
acknowledged that it adopted this presumption from copyright doctrine, 126
and the circuit has specifically analogized the property rights of copyright
law to patent law in support of such application. 127 The Federal Circuit
also implicitly applied this presumption to permanent injunctions, and
routinely granted the remedy upon a finding of infringement, 128 until the
seminal case eBay v. MercExchange.
II. EBAY AND ITS PROGENY: CASTING DOUBT ON THE PRESUMPTION
OF IRREPARABLE HARM
Part II first introduces the eBay decision, which ushered in a “sea
change” 129 by holding that plaintiffs are not automatically entitled to
permanent injunctions following a holding of patent infringement. Without
express guidance from the Court regarding whether eBay explicitly
abolished the presumption of irreparable harm—in addition to its broad
language analogizing patent to copyright law—division emerged among
lower courts prior to Jacobsen with respect to eBay’s extension to copyright
119. See Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 544 F.3d 1341, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Federal
Circuit precedent developed to match the rest of the nation.”).
120. See, e.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“[T]o obtain a preliminary injunction . . . a party must establish a right thereto in light of
four factors: (1) reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) the
balance of hardships tipping in its favor; and (4) the impact of the injunction on the public
interest.”).
121. STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 81, at 6.
122. 718 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
123. Id. at 1581 (“We hold that where validity and continuing infringement have been
clearly established, as in this case, immediate irreparable harm is presumed.”).
124. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
125. See Smith, 718 F.2d at 1581; accord H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc.,
820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“This presumption derives in part from the finite term of
the patent grant, for patent expiration is not suspended during litigation, and the passage of
time can work irremediable harm. . . . The nature of the patent grant thus weighs against
holding that monetary damages will always suffice to make the patentee whole, for the
principal value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude.”).
126. Smith, 718 F.2d at 1581 n.7 (“This is the rule in copyright cases.”).
127. See Roper Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 757 F.2d 1266, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[N]o
warrant exists in law to distinguish the criteria for presuming irreparable injury to the
property right created by letters patent from those available to protect the property right
created by copyright.”).
128. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“It
is the general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged . . . .”).
129. 4 NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][3][a].
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preliminary injunctions. 130 This part explores this division by analyzing the
diverse application of eBay to both patent and copyright cases before the
Jacobsen decision.
A. eBay v. MercExchange
In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,131 the Supreme Court
unanimously held that permanent injunctions do not automatically follow a
ruling of patent infringement,132 and that traditional principles of equity
apply equally to patent disputes.133 In the case, MercExchange claimed that
eBay infringed its patent in an electronic market business method.134 After
a jury found that eBay had infringed MercExchange’s valid patent and
awarded damages, the district court denied MercExchange’s motion for a
permanent injunction.135 The denial was based on its categorical
conclusion that irreparable harm could not occur due to factors including
MercExchange’s willingness to license patents, and the lack of commercial
activity in using them. 136 On appeal, the Federal Circuit applied its own
general rule that “a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and
validity have been adjudged” absent “exceptional circumstances,” and
reversed the district court. 137
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the Federal Circuit’s
general rule, and held that it did not conform to traditional principles of
equity. 138 Citing to two previous decisions for support, including Amoco
Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 139 the Court stated that to meet these
principles, a plaintiff “must demonstrate” the following four factors:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. 140

After reiterating that courts should not depart from traditional equitable
principles without statutory direction,141 the Court confirmed that these
principles “apply with equal force” to patent disputes, as the Patent Act’s
130. See infra Parts II.B–C.
131. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
132. Id. at 394.
133. Id. at 391.
134. Id. at 390.
135. Id. at 391.
136. Id. at 393.
137. Id. at 393–94 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
138. Id. at 393.
139. 480 U.S. 531 (1987) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s application of the presumption of
irreparable harm where plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctive relief due to defendant’s
violation of an environmental statute).
140. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing Amoco, 480 U.S. at 542; Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–13 (1982)).
141. Id. (“As this Court has long recognized, ‘a major departure from the long tradition of
equity practice should not be lightly implied.’” (quoting Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 320)).
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language expressly permits injunctions to issue “‘in accordance with the
principles of equity.’” 142 While the Court recognized a patent holder’s
fundamental right to exclude, it noted that “the creation of a right is distinct
from the provision of remedies for violations of that right,” and rejected the
automatic grant of an injunction once infringement was found. 143
The eBay Court then compared patent law with copyright law for
additional support. First, it held that both copyright and patent law permit
the right to exclude. 144 Further, both Acts provide that courts “may” grant
injunctive relief on terms they deem reasonable to prevent infringement.145
Finally, the Court held that because it had “consistently rejected invitations
to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction
automatically follows [copyright infringement],” rejection of the Federal
Circuit’s general rule in the patent law context was consistent with previous
rulings. 146 As neither lower court had applied the correct four-factor test,
the Court remanded the case to the district court to exercise discretion
consistent with these equitable principles, “in patent disputes no less than in
other cases governed by such standards.” 147
Chief Justice Roberts noted in his concurrence that courts’ historical
tendency to grant injunctive relief once patent infringement was found
likely owed to the difficulty of protecting the right to exclude through
monetary damages. 148 While this did not entitle a patent holder to a
permanent injunction, he emphasized that “‘a page of history is worth a
volume of logic.’” 149 In a separate concurrence, Justice Kennedy agreed
that history is instructive in applying the four-factor test, but believed that
the practice of frequently issuing injunctions merely reflected the result of
applying the four-factor test in historical contexts.150 He stated that the
current rise of an industry where patent holders threaten injunctions to seek
high licensing fees presents an economically novel situation where
monetary damages may sufficiently compensate for infringement, and “may
affect calculus under the four-factor test.” 151 According to Justice
Kennedy, courts should therefore use their equitable discretion to determine
whether past practice fits with the circumstances of their cases. 152

142. Id. at 391–92 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006)).
143. Id. at 392.
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also supra note 118 and accompanying text.
146. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392–93 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505
(2001); Dun v. Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1908)). In Tasini, the Court
quoted Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc. for the proposition that the “goals of copyright
law ‘are not always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief.’” Tasini, 533
U.S. at 505 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S 569, 578 n.10 (1994)).
The Dun Court held that in cases where “an injunction would be unconscionable . . . the
copyright owner should be remitted to his remedy at law.” Dun, 209 U.S. at 23.
147. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
148. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
149. Id. (quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (Holmes, J.)).
150. See id. at 395–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 397.
152. Id.
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B. eBay’s Effect on the Presumption in the Patent Context
Without specific guidance from the eBay Court as to whether the
presumption of irreparable harm survived its decision, district courts
reached various conclusions. Although most courts agreed that eBay
dismissed the presumption as applied to patent law, some continued to
apply it. However, by refusing to address the issue directly, the Federal
Circuit did little to clarify the confusion. This section examines these
interpretations of eBay’s effect on the presumption in the patent realm prior
to Jacobsen.
In the first few years after eBay, the Federal Circuit did not provide
guidance as to the presumption’s continuing vitality. First, in Abbott
Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 153 the court assumed without
deciding that the presumption of irreparable harm still applied to
The court later had two more direct
preliminary injunctions. 154
opportunities to address eBay’s effect on the presumption, once in a case
involving a preliminary injunction,155 and in another relating to permanent
injunctive relief. 156 In discussions confined entirely to footnotes in both
cases, the Federal Circuit declined to address the contention, finding it
unnecessary to do so to resolve either case. 157
This lack of express guidance forced district courts to make sense of the
seemingly inconsistent presumption in a post-eBay landscape. The majority
of district courts interpreted eBay as doing away with the presumption of
irreparable harm. The eBay district court reached this conclusion on
remand, and found the presumption to be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s requirement that the burden be on the plaintiff to prove irreparable
harm. 158 Most notably, the eBay district court pointed to Amoco, wherein
the Supreme Court had held that the “presumption [of irreparable harm] is
contrary to traditional equitable principles.”159 Other district courts reached
the same conclusion, holding that requiring a plaintiff to prove irreparable

153. 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
154. Id. at 1347 (“[W]e conclude that Abbott has not established a likelihood of success
on the merits. As a result, Abbott is no longer entitled to a presumption of irreparable
harm.”).
155. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
156. Amado v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
157. See id. at 1359 n.1 (“We find it unnecessary to reach this argument, however,
because regardless of whether there remains a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm
following eBay, the district court was within its discretion to find an absence of irreparable
harm based on the evidence presented at trial.”); Sanofi, 470 F.3d at 1383 n.9 (“Because we
conclude that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Sanofi established several
kinds of irreparable harm . . . we need not address this contention [that eBay rejects the
presumption].”).
158. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 (E.D. Va. 2007)
(“[A] presumption of irreparable harm is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s instruction
that traditional equitable principles require the plaintiff to demonstrate that it has suffered an
irreparable injury . . . .”).
159. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (reversing Ninth
Circuit precedent presuming irreparable harm “when an agency fails to evaluate thoroughly
the environmental impact of a proposed action”); see supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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harm could not be squared with a presumption of such harm.160
Additionally, several courts also found that eBay’s holding was not limited
to permanent injunctions, and held that the presumption did not survive in
the preliminary injunction context either.161 Some courts, however, held
that despite eBay, the presumption still applied in the context of preliminary
injunctive relief. 162
C. eBay’s Effect on the Presumption in the Copyright Context
The uncertainty plaguing district courts with respect to eBay’s effect on
the longstanding presumption of irreparable harm was even more prevalent
in the copyright context. The eBay Court’s analogy of patent to copyright
led many courts to apply eBay’s four-factor test to injunctions in the
copyright context, but there was little agreement on how far eBay cast its
net. This section analyzes courts’ application of eBay to copyright
injunctions prior to Jacobsen, including its effect on copyright’s
160. See, e.g., IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 224 (D. Del. 2007)
(noting the “now-overturned presumption that a patent holder is irreparably harmed upon a
finding of infringement”); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978,
982 (W.D. Tenn. 2006) (“The [eBay] Court thus rejected the traditional rebuttable
presumption that a permanent injunction is to be automatically awarded to the plaintiff upon
a showing of the validity and infringement of the patent.”), appeal dismissed, 269 F. App’x
972 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211, 2006 WL
2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (“The eBay decision demonstrates that no
presumption of irreparable harm should automatically follow from a finding of
infringement.”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007); z4 Techs.,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that the
presumption of irreparable harm “is not in line with the Supreme Court’s holding” in eBay).
161. See, e.g., Tiber Labs., LLC v. Hawthorn Pharm., Inc., 527 F Supp. 2d 1373, 1380
(N.D. Ga. 2007) (“eBay does not leave room for a presumption of irreparable injury in patent
cases, whether raised at the preliminary or permanent injunction phase.”); Novartis Pharm.
Corp. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 05-CV-1887, 2007 WL 2669338, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept.
6, 2007) (relying on “eBay’s broader holding that, on motions for injunctions, courts should
not apply categorical rules and presumptions”), aff’d 280 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Sun
Optics, Inc. v. FGX Int’l, Inc., No. 07-137, 2007 WL 2228569, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2007)
(holding that allowing a presumption of irreparable harm following a showing of likelihood
of success on the merits seems inconsistent with eBay), appeal dismissed, 275 F. App’x 967
(Fed. Cir. 2008); Torspo Hockey Int’l, Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd., 491 F. Supp. 2d 871, 881
(D. Minn. 2007) (explaining that although eBay addressed permanent injunctions, “eBay’s
logic forbids courts to categorically presume irreparable harm in the preliminary-injunction
context, even if a patentee has established that it will likely succeed on the merits”); Erico
Int’l Corp. v. Doc’s Mktg. Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2924, 2007 WL 108450, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Jan.
9, 2007) (“While Ebay involved a permanent injunction specifically, the Court did not limit
its holding to that context; the Court’s reasoning likely applies with even greater force at the
preliminary injunction stage.”), vacated sub nom. Erico Int’l Corp. v. Vutec Corp., 516 F.3d
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
162. See Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Hubbell, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 418, 432 (N.D.N.Y.
2007) (noting eBay’s applicability to permanent injunctions but continuing to cite the
presumption for preliminary injunctions); PHG Techs., LLC v. TimeMed Labeling Sys.,
Inc., No. 3:05-1091, 2006 WL 2670967, at *18 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 18, 2006) (citing the
presumption in a preliminary injunction motion without referencing eBay), appeal dismissed,
225 F. App’x 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Christiana Indus. v. Empire Elecs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d
870, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (holding that “eBay did not invalidate the presumption” because
“the eBay Court addressed the proper analysis for permanent injunctive relief”), appeal
dismissed, 219 F. App’x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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presumption of irreparable harm. After first discussing circuit courts’
adoption of eBay in the context of permanent injunctive relief, this section
then explores district courts’ conflicting conclusions concerning whether, in
light of eBay, harm could still be presumed following probable success of
copyright infringement.
1. Circuit Courts Apply eBay to Permanent Injunctions
Prior to Jacobsen, three circuit courts held that eBay applied to the grant
of a permanent injunction for copyright infringement. 163 In Christopher
Phelps & Associates, LLC v. Galloway, 164 the Fourth Circuit rejected the
view that a copyright holder is entitled to permanent injunctive relief after
infringement is proven. 165 In Galloway, the plaintiff argued entitlement to
injunctive relief, despite recovery of damages, based on past infringement
and a threat of continuing infringement. 166 The court rejected this
contention, emphasizing that eBay “reaffirmed the traditional showing that
a plaintiff must make to obtain a permanent injunction in any type of case,
including a patent or copyright case.” 167 The Eleventh Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in Peter Letterese & Associates, Inc. v. World Institute of
Scientology Enterprises, International, 168 where the court held that eBay’s
principles applied to permanent injunctions in the copyright context, noting
that “a permanent injunction does not automatically issue upon a finding of
copyright infringement.” 169 The court cited language from the eBay
decision analogizing the Copyright Act to the Patent Act to support its
application of eBay to copyright infringement cases.170 Finally, the First
Circuit joined the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits in CoxCom, Inc. v.
Chaffee, 171 citing eBay for the proposition that “[a] plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction is traditionally required to satisfy a four-factor

163. CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008); Peter Letterese &
Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., Int’l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir.
2008); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
But see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F.3d 470, 492 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding, without any discussion of eBay, that a plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction
once past copyright infringement has been established and there is a threat of continuing
infringement); Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 196 F. App’x
166, 169–70 (4th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citing the presumption as applied to preliminary
injunctions without any mention of eBay, but finding it rebutted by evidence defeating
plaintiff’s prima facie infringement claim).
164. 492 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007).
165. See id. at 543.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. 533 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2008).
169. Id. at 1323.
170. Id. at 1323 (“‘Like the Patent Act, the Copyright Act provides that courts may grant
injunctive relief on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement
of a copyright.’” (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006))).
171. 536 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2008).
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test.” 172 However, none of the circuits addressed eBay’s potential effect on
the presumption of irreparable harm. 173
2. District Courts Reach Conflicting Conclusions
With no clear direction from either the Supreme Court or the circuit
courts regarding eBay’s effect on copyright law’s presumption of
irreparable harm, district courts applied eBay in the copyright context prior
to Jacobsen in myriad ways. While several courts applied eBay’s four
factors to the copyright permanent injunction analysis,174 some of them
continued to presume irreparable harm upon a showing of probable success
on the merits. 175 Other courts held that eBay did not apply to preliminary
injunctions and continued to apply the presumption of irreparable harm to
such relief, 176 while at least one claimed to apply eBay to preliminary
injunctions and yet continued to enforce the presumption once a likelihood
of success was established. 177 The confusion that troubled district courts
concerning the presumption’s continuing vitality in copyright preliminary
injunctions was aptly illustrated by the U.S. District Court for the Western

172. Id. at 112 (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (2006)).
173. While the Fourth Circuit did not state that it was presuming irreparable harm upon
liability, it based its finding that irreparable harm had been suffered purely on copyright’s
intangible nature, and required no further proof from the plaintiff. See Christopher Phelps &
Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 544 (4th Cir. 2007) (“Irreparable injury often
derives from the nature of copyright violations, which deprive the copyright holder of
intangible exclusive rights.”).
174. See, e.g., Propet USA, Inc. v. Shugart, No. C06-0186, 2007 WL 4376204, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 13, 2007) (holding that eBay applies in the copyright context because the
eBay Court stated its approach to patent cases was consistent with injunction treatment under
the Copyright Act); Litecubes, L.L.C. v. N. Light Prods., Inc., No. 4:04CV00485, 2006 WL
5700252, at *10 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 25, 2006) (holding that the similarity of language between
the Patent and Copyright Acts demonstrates that federal courts have similar authority to
grant permanent injunctions to copyright and patent holders), aff’d on other grounds, 523
F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
175. See Idearc Media Corp. v. Nw. Directories, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1234 (D. Or.
2008) (explaining that it was “mindful” of the eBay decision and applying the eBay factors
to its permanent injunction analysis, but also presuming irreparable harm in accordance with
precedent); Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. Carsagno, No. 06 CV 2676, 2007 WL 1655666, at
*4–5 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (holding that while the plaintiff must meet eBay’s four factors
to obtain permanent injunctive relief, including that it has suffered an irreparable injury, such
harm was demonstrated by a prima facie case of infringement).
176. See, e.g., Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 319 n.1 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (stating that eBay did not abrogate the presumption in the copyright preliminary
injunction context because eBay involved only the Patent Act and permanent relief);
Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 638 (D. Md. 2006)
(applying pre-eBay Fourth Circuit precedent presuming irreparable harm in preliminary
injunction motions once the plaintiff establishes prima facie copyright infringement, but
noting that it would apply the eBay factors when determining permanent injunctive relief).
177. See Wireless TV Studios, Inc. v. Digital Dispatch Sys., Inc., No. 07 CV 5103, 2008
WL 2474626, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2008) (citing eBay for the traditional equitable
principles governing injunctive relief, yet holding that the presumption of irreparable harm
failed only because plaintiff did not establish the required likelihood of success on the
merits).
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District of North Carolina’s treatment of the issue, where two divisions of
the same district court reached opposite conclusions.178
The clearest rejection of the presumption came from the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 179 The court held the eBay test to be directly
applicable to permanent injunctions for copyright infringement, 180 and
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s pre-eBay presumption of irreparable harm in
light of eBay’s emphasis on the plaintiffs’ burden of proof in establishing
such harm. 181 While the court ruled on a permanent injunction, it also
opined that the presumption as applied to preliminary injunctive relief “may
itself have to be reevaluated in light of eBay,” due in part to eBay’s
favorable citation of Amoco. 182 The Grokster court first noted that this
demonstrated that Amoco’s holding that “a presumption of irreparable harm
for a preliminary injunction is ‘contrary to traditional equitable principles’”
was relevant to intellectual property cases.183 Further, the court believed
that eBay’s reliance on Amoco, a preliminary injunction case, as support for
the four-factor test indicated the Court’s belief that permanent and
preliminary injunctions should be treated similarly. 184 Ultimately, the court
read eBay and Amoco in conjunction to establish that a court should not
depart from the traditional equitable analysis unless statutorily directed,185
and concluded that nothing in the Copyright Act permitted such a departure

178. Compare Nat’l League of Junior Cotillions v. Porter, No. 3:06-cv-508, 2007 WL
2316823, at *5–6 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2007) (continuing to apply the precedential
presumption of irreparable harm in light of the lack of clarification from the Fourth Circuit
and the “slight record,” but making clear “it [did] not rest any conclusion that the plaintiff
has suffered irreparable harm solely on the presumption”), aff’d on other grounds, 280 F.
App’x 322 (4th Cir. 2008), with Allora, LLC v. Brownstone, Inc., No. 1:07CV87, 2007 WL
1246448, at *5 (W.D.N.C Apr. 27, 2007) (refusing to follow Fourth Circuit pre-eBay
precedent presuming irreparable harm upon a prima facie showing of copyright infringement
without further Fourth Circuit guidance).
179. 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
180. Id. at 1209 (stating that eBay established that permanent injunctions should be
treated the same under the Copyright Act as the Patent Act and “[b]y implication, the four
eBay factors are the only relevant considerations for purposes of Plaintiffs’ instant motion
under the Copyright Act”).
181. Id. (“This Court can identify no place for a separate and distinct two-part . . . test or
‘general rule’ that could circumvent eBay.”). The court also cited several patent
infringement decisions finding that eBay did away with the presumption of irreparable harm
as related to permanent injunctions. See id. at 1209–10 (collecting cases); see also supra note
160 (collecting cases).
182. Id. at 1212–13. But see id. at 1212 (arguing that it might also be sensible to permit
the presumption in preliminary injunction motions due to the temporary status of such
relief).
183. Id. at 1212–14 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545
(1987)) (noting that prior to eBay, the Amoco decision seemed limited to its holding
regarding the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act).
184. See id. at 1214; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
185. See Grokster, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.
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to presume irreparable harm in either the preliminary or permanent
injunction contexts. 186
III. JACOBSEN V. KATZER AND THE SUBSEQUENT DEATH
OF THE COPYRIGHT PRESUMPTION
As discussed in Part II, lack of Supreme Court clarification as to whether
eBay abrogated the longstanding presumption of irreparable harm resulted
in a multitude of conflicting district court applications of eBay to copyright
injunctions. 187 Against this backdrop, the Federal Circuit decided Jacobsen
v. Katzer, 188 in which it addressed the presumption of irreparable harm as
applied to copyright preliminary injunctions.189 Part III first explores
Jacobsen’s reaffirmation of the pre-eBay presumption. It then chronicles
how subsequent case law has rejected the Federal Circuit’s logic and
spelled the death of the presumption in the context of copyright injunctions.
A. Jacobsen v. Katzer: Applying a Pre-eBay Standard to a Post-eBay Case
In Jacobsen, the plaintiff appealed from an order denying him
preliminary injunctive relief for copyright infringement. 190
Robert
Jacobsen owned a copyright in a software code, which he made available
for free downloading on the internet pursuant to an open-source license.191
Jacobsen accused the defendants of incorporating his code into their
products without abiding by the license.192 Jacobsen moved for a
preliminary injunction in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California, arguing that he was entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm
under Ninth Circuit law once he demonstrated prima facie copyright
infringement. 193 The court concluded that the defendants had breached a
nonexclusive license, and only breach of contract violations—and not
copyright infringement—existed. 194 Because a breach of contract created
no presumption of irreparable harm, the court denied injunctive relief, and
Jacobsen appealed to the Federal Circuit for reversal of the interlocutory
order denying the preliminary injunction.195
In addressing its appellate jurisdiction over the copyright case, the
Federal Circuit found that Jacobsen’s complaint arose in part under the
patent laws, because Jacobsen also sought a declaratory judgment that he
186. See id. (emphasizing that the Copyright Act merely states that a court
“‘may . . . grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to
prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006))).
187. See supra Part II.C.2.
188. 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
189. See id. at 1377.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1376 (defining an open-source license as a “public license” through which
Jacobsen made his software “available for free public download from a website without a
financial fee”).
192. See id.
193. See id. at 1377.
194. See id.
195. See id.
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did not infringe a patent owned by the defendant.196 Therefore, the court
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal of the interlocutory order
denying Jacobsen’s request for a preliminary injunction.197 In determining
choice of law, the court stated that established Federal Circuit precedent
required it to apply regional circuit law to issues not exclusively assigned to
it—in this case, Ninth Circuit law with respect to preliminary injunction
standards for copyright infringement.198 At the time, the Ninth Circuit had
applied its standard two-part test for issuing copyright preliminary
injunctions199 in one post-eBay case, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.
(Perfect 10 II),200 where it had not addressed eBay. The Ninth Circuit had
not addressed the presumption of irreparable harm since eBay was
decided.201
The Jacobsen court cited Perfect 10 II in applying the Ninth Circuit’s
two-part test for issuing a preliminary injunction,202 and also applied the
Ninth Circuit’s pre-eBay presumption of irreparable harm when the
copyright holder has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.203 It did
so even as it recognized that eBay may have altered the landscape; the court
expressly addressed the eBay decision and its potential impact on Ninth
Circuit law in a passing citation to Grokster,204 but did not afford this
decision any weight in its analysis. Instead, the court concluded that the
196. Id. (“‘[I]n the context of a complaint seeking a declaration of noninfringement, the
action threatened by the declaratory defendant . . . would be an action for patent
infringement,’ and ‘[s]uch an action clearly arises under the patent laws.’” (quoting Golan v.
Pingel Enter., Inc., 310 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002))).
197. Id.; see also supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text (describing the relevant law
conferring Federal Circuit jurisdiction over pendent non-patent claims).
198. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1377–78; see also supra Part I.A.2.
199. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
200. 487 F.3d 701, 713–14 (9th Cir. 2007), amended by 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
201. Perfect 10 II, the only Ninth Circuit case at the time of the Jacobsen ruling that
involved a copyright preliminary injunction post-eBay, refrained from addressing the
presumption of irreparable harm. See id. at 733 (“[W]e do not address the parties’ dispute
over whether the district court abused its discretion in determining that Perfect 10 satisfied
the irreparable harm element of a preliminary injunction.”).
202. See Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1378 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit requires demonstration of (1) a
combination of probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable harm;
or (2) serious questions going to the merits where the balance of hardships tips sharply in the
moving party’s favor.” (citing Perfect 10 II, 487 F.3d at 713–14)). Such a decision without
analysis of eBay was not, however, binding Ninth Circuit precedent regarding eBay’s
application to copyright preliminary injunctions. See Thacker v. FCC (In re Magnacom
Wireless, LLC), 503 F.3d 984, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tatements made in passing,
without analysis, are not binding precedent.”); United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915
(9th Cir. 2001) (“Where it is clear that a statement is made casually and without analysis,
where the statement is uttered in passing without due consideration of the alternatives . . . it
may be appropriate to re-visit the issue in a later case.”); cf. Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v.
Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[S]ummary treatment of the
presumption without consideration of the effect of eBay and Winter does not bind this panel
or constitute an affirmation of the presumption’s continued vitality.”).
203. Jacobsen, 535 F.3d at 1378 (“In cases involving copyright claims, where a copyright
holder has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of a copyright infringement claim, the
Ninth Circuit has held that irreparable harm is presumed.” (citing LGS Architects, Inc. v.
Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2006))).
204. See id.
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plaintiff must show “a likelihood of success on the merits . . . from which
irreparable harm is presumed.” 205 Finding that the open-source license
terms were enforceable copyright conditions, the court remanded to the
district court to determine whether the two-part standard, including
presumption, was met. 206
B. Jacobsen’s Aftermath
Shortly after the Jacobsen court directed the district court to presume
irreparable harm upon a finding of prima facie copyright infringement,
courts continued to chip away at the presumption as applied to copyright
preliminary injunctions. First, the Supreme Court in Winter rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s “possibility of irreparable harm” standard for preliminary
injunctive relief. Next, three circuits explicitly abandoned the presumption
for purposes of obtaining copyright preliminary injunctions, ruling that the
doctrine was inconsistent with both eBay and Winter. Finally, the Federal
Circuit has recently cited agreement with its sister circuits in abandoning
the presumption in the patent context. This section examines each of these
opinions.
1. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Three months after Jacobsen, the Supreme Court handed down Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 207 where plaintiffs sought a
preliminary injunction to prevent the Navy from employing a sonar-training
program that it felt harmed marine animals.208 After the Ninth Circuit
upheld the injunction, the Supreme Court reversed.209 The Court rejected
the Ninth Circuit’s standard that a preliminary injunction may issue based
on a “possibility” of irreparable harm if the plaintiff demonstrated a strong
likelihood of success on the merits. 210 The Court held that this standard
was “too lenient” and inconsistent with the “extraordinary remedy” of
injunctive relief, which requires a clear showing by the plaintiff that she is
entitled to this remedy. 211 Rather, the Court required plaintiffs to establish
a likelihood of irreparable injury. 212

205. Id. (emphasis added). The court continued that in the alternative, Jacobsen must
demonstrate the other option provided by the Ninth Circuit’s test, “a fair chance of success
on the merits and a clear disparity in the relative hardships that tips sharply in his favor.” Id.
206. See id. at 1382–83 (“[W]e remand to enable the District Court to determine whether
Jacobsen has demonstrated (1) a likelihood of success on the merits and either a presumption
of irreparable harm or a demonstration of irreparable harm; or (2) a fair chance of success on
the merits and a clear disparity in the relative hardships and tipping in his favor.”).
207. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
208. Id. at 12.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 22.
211. Id. (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)).
212. See id. (citing several cases for the proposition that this standard has been
“frequently reiterated”).
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In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that preliminary
injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,”213
and confirmed the four-factor test that must be employed in all preliminary
injunction cases: “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”214
The Winter Court also reiterated that such an analysis, which paralleled the
principles articulated in eBay,215 also applied to permanent injunctions.216
2. Circuits Abandon the Presumption for Copyright Preliminary
Injunctions
Although Winter, like eBay, did not explicitly reject the presumption of
irreparable harm in cases concerning copyright injunctions, it had far
reaching implications. While the Jacobsen court had instructed the
Northern District of California on remand to apply the Ninth Circuit’s twopart test and presume irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of
success,217 the district court did not comply. Instead, it held that Winter had
changed the injunction landscape and abandoned the presumption of
irreparable harm upon which the Federal Circuit had relied.218 Because the
Supreme Court’s intervening authority bound the district court, the
Northern District of California held that a plaintiff must meet each element
of Winter’s four-factor test before the court could issue a preliminary
injunction.219 Most other district courts that addressed the question
similarly held that the presumption did not survive both Winter and eBay in
the copyright context.220

213. Id. at 24.
214. Id. at 20.
215. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
216. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 33 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S.
531, 546 n.12 (1987)); id. at 33 (“[O]ur analysis of the propriety of preliminary relief is
applicable to any permanent injunction as well.”).
217. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text.
218. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d 925, 936 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
219. See id. at 937.
220. See, e.g., Credit Bureau Connection, Inc. v. Pardini, 726 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1122–23
(E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Winter and eBay support the proposition that the presumption
for irreparable harm does not exist “even in intellectual property cases”); Aurora World, Inc.
v. Ty Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1166–69 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that because eBay is
not limited to patent cases or permanent injunctions, “[the plaintiff] is not entitled to invoke
a presumption of irreparable harm”); Momento, Inc. v. Seccion Amarilla USA, No. C 091223, 2009 WL 1974798, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2009) (“The Court agrees . . . that it should
not automatically presume a demonstration of irreparable harm in copyright cases since the
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay.”). But see Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268–
69 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[eBay] dealt only with the presumption of irreparable harm in the
patent law context, and thus is not controlling . . . in the copyright context.”), vacated, 607
F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010); RDI of Mich., LLC v. Mich. Coin-Op Vending, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 2d
868, 874 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (applying the Sixth Circuit’s pre-eBay presumption in a
copyright preliminary injunction case without mentioning eBay).
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Circuit courts also responded to the changed landscape following eBay
and Winter. The Second, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits have held that eBay’s
four-factor test is applicable to preliminary injunction determinations in the
copyright context,221 and that a likelihood of success on the merits no
longer raises a presumption of irreparable harm.222
a. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit’s decision in Salinger v. Colting223 marked the first
time that any circuit court had squarely addressed whether eBay abrogated
the presumption of irreparable harm.224 In Salinger, the court held that
eBay had abrogated two of the circuit’s rules: (1) its longstanding two-part
test for issuing a preliminary injunction in the copyright context, and (2) its
standard of presuming irreparable harm once a plaintiff establishes a
likelihood of success on the merits.225 The case involved a suit by J.D.
Salinger, who alleged that Fredrik Colting’s purported sequel to Salinger’s
novel Catcher in the Rye constituted copyright infringement.226 The U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York applied the Second
Circuit’s two-part test for issuing preliminary injunctions, and, having
found that plaintiff Salinger established a prima facie case of copyright
infringement, “presumed irreparable harm without discussion.”227
The Second Circuit vacated and remanded for consideration of traditional
equitable principles, holding that eBay applied to both copyright
infringement and preliminary injunctive relief.228 Indeed, while the court
limited its holding to copyright, it indicated a belief that eBay’s principles
extended to the grant of any type of injunction.229 Regarding copyright, the
court held that the eBay decision was not limited to patent cases,230 and that
by relying upon copyright cases, the eBay Court made “clear that [it] did
221. The First and Eleventh Circuits have applied eBay to trademark infringement, but
both have declined to decide whether the presumption of irreparable harm survived eBay.
See, e.g., Peoples Fed. Sav. Bank v. People’s United Bank, No. 10-2053, 2012 WL 414251,
at *6 n.11 (1st Cir. Feb. 10, 2012); N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d
1211, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008). Trademark infringement analysis is beyond the scope of this
Note.
222. See Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entm’t Corp., No. 11-1860, 2011 WL
5084587, at *2–3 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 2011) (per curiam); Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc., v.
Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Google, Inc. (Perfect 10 III), 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W.
3366 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2012) (No. 11-704); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir. 2010).
223. 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
224. Newman, supra note 22, at 357.
225. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 74–75; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
226. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 72.
227. Id.; see also Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268–69 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
vacated, 607 F.3d 68.
228. See id. at 77.
229. See id. at 78 n.7.
230. See id. at 78 (construing eBay’s reasoning that the logic of other cases employing the
traditional principles of equity (Weinberger & Amoco) should apply in the patent context to
conclude that “‘[t]hese familiar principles apply with equal force to disputes arising under
the Patent Act’” (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006))).
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not view patent and copyright injunctions as different in kind, or as
requiring different standards.”231 The Second Circuit also held that eBay’s
application to preliminary injunctions was clear because the eBay Court
relied upon Amoco, a preliminary injunction case, in articulating the
traditional four-factor test.232 Moreover, the Winter Court had “in fact
applied eBay in a case involving a preliminary injunction.”233
In light of the traditional equitable principles articulated in Winter and
eBay, the Second Circuit formulated a new four-part test for copyright
preliminary injunctions.234 Regarding the second prong, irreparable harm,
the court squarely rejected its long-held presumption standard, and held that
“[a]fter eBay, . . . courts must not simply presume irreparable harm.”235
Rather, plaintiffs must now show that a lack of injunctive relief will
“actually cause irreparable harm.”236 The Second Circuit upheld the district
court’s finding of infringement—the first factor—but remanded back to the
Southern District of New York to apply the remaining three factors,
including proof of irreparable harm.237 Notably, the Second Circuit
contrasted the Federal Circuit’s decision in Jacobsen to its own in a
footnote,238 alluding to a possible circuit split regarding whether eBay
abrogated the presumption of irreparable harm as applied to copyright
cases.239

231. Id. The Second Circuit mentioned the eBay Court’s comparison of patent to
copyright in noting that both Acts permit injunctive relief to be granted when the court
deems reasonable, and both grant the owner a right to exclude. Id. (citing eBay, 547 U.S. at
392).
232. See id. at 78–79 (emphasizing that the Amoco Court equated the standards for
granting preliminary and permanent injunctions).
233. Id. at 79. While the Winter Court never explicitly mentioned eBay, the Second
Circuit pointed to the Court’s “broad, unqualified language,” id., describing the preliminary
injunction standard as “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” and one in
which “courts must balance the competing claims of injury,” “must consider the effect on
each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief,” and “pay particular regard
for the public consequences,” id. (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).
234. See id. at 79–80 (holding that (1) plaintiff must demonstrate “either a likelihood of
success on the merits or . . . sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a
fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the plaintiff’s
favor,” (2) “[plaintiff] is likely to suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction,”
(3) “the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant . . . [must] tip[] in the
plaintiff’s favor,” and (4) “the court must ensure that the public interest would not be
disserved by the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” (internal quotations and citations
omitted)).
235. Id. at 82; see also id. at 80 (“The court must not adopt a ‘categorical’ or ‘general’
rule or presume that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm.” (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at
391)).
236. Id. at 82.
237. Id. at 83.
238. Id. at 77 n.6 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has, without discussion, applied a pre-eBay
standard in one post-eBay copyright case involving a preliminary injunction.”).
239. See Injunction in Salinger Case to be Reweighed in Light of Supreme Court’s
Holding in eBay, 78 U.S.L.W. 1721 (May 18, 2010) (“The court noted a possible circuit split
on whether the eBay standard applies to copyright cases, with the Federal Circuit apparently
holding it does not.”).
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b. The Ninth Circuit
After the Second Circuit rejected the presumption as applied to copyright
preliminary injunctions, the Ninth Circuit followed suit in two separate
decisions. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc. (Perfect 10 III), the Ninth
Circuit applied Winter’s four-part preliminary injunction test and
“effectively overruled” its longstanding precedent that a likelihood of
success on the merits of a copyright claim raises a presumption of
irreparable harm. 240 The case involved a lawsuit against Google and
Amazon.com for infringement of Perfect 10’s copyrighted images. 241 The
district court denied Perfect 10’s motion for a preliminary injunction on the
grounds that it had failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm.242
Perfect 10 argued on appeal that the court must apply the precedential
presumption of irreparable harm due to a strong showing of likelihood of
success on the merits. 243
However, the Ninth Circuit held that eBay abrogated this presumption. 244
Agreeing with the Second Circuit in Salinger, the court found that eBay
clarified that the Copyright Act’s permissive language 245 did not
demonstrate a congressional intent to depart from traditional equitable
principles to allow such a presumption.246 Further, the court stated that
Supreme Court precedent compelled the holding that eBay’s rule extends to
preliminary injunctive relief, citing Amoco for the proposition that there is
little difference between preliminary and permanent injunctions.247
Ultimately, the court effectively overruled its precedent, holding the
presumption of irreparable harm to be “clearly irreconcilable” with eBay’s
reasoning. 248
Several weeks later, another panel of the Ninth Circuit reached the same
conclusion after a thorough analysis of the doctrine. In Flexible Lifeline
240. 653 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S. Mar. 5,
2012) (No. 11-704) (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc),
for the proposition that where the reasoning of prior Ninth Circuit authority is clearly
irreconcilable with intervening Supreme Court authority, a three-judge panel is bound by the
later Supreme Court authority, and should reject prior circuit opinion as having been
effectively overruled).
241. See Perfect 10 III, 653 F.3d at 978. This appeal marked the second time the Ninth
Circuit dealt with Perfect 10’s motion for a preliminary injunction against defendants Google
and Amazon. Id. Interestingly, the first appeal, Perfect 10 II, was cited by the Federal
Circuit in Jacobsen to enumerate the two-part test for preliminary injunctions in the Ninth
Circuit. See supra note 202.
242. See Perfect 10 III, 653 F.3d at 977.
243. See id. at 980.
244. See id.
245. The Copyright Act states that a court “may” grant injunctive relief “on such terms as
it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 502(a) (2006); Perfect 10 III, 653 F.3d at 980 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006)).
246. Id. at 980.
247. Id. at 981 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12
(1987)); cf. supra note 232 (noting the Second Circuit’s identical reasoning).
248. Perfect 10 III, 653 F.3d at 981 (quoting Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th
Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
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Systems, Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., the plaintiff sued Precision Lift for
copyright infringement of technical drawings of aircraft maintenance
stands, and moved for a preliminary injunction.249 The U.S. District Court
for the District of Montana, finding that Flexible Lifeline was likely to
succeed on its copyright infringement claim, granted the preliminary
injunction based on the Ninth Circuit’s precedential presumption of
irreparable harm.250
The Ninth Circuit held that eBay applied to copyright cases as well as
patent cases, and to preliminary as well as permanent injunctions.251 The
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning paralleled that of the Second Circuit in Salinger,
as the Flexible Lifeline court held that eBay’s extension to copyright is
discernable from the comparison the Court drew between patent and
copyright protection.252 The Ninth Circuit also similarly held that eBay
applies with equal force to preliminary injunctions due to eBay’s reliance
on Amoco253 and Winter’s reaffirmation of the four-factor test to a
preliminary injunction.254
After reiterating the traditional four-part test cited in Winter for granting
a preliminary injunction in any case,255 the court effectively overruled its
precedential presumption of irreparable harm, and preconditioned injunctive
relief on the plaintiff’s demonstration of irreparable harm.256 The court
then noted the agreement of other circuits and authorities in holding that the
presumption did not survive eBay and Winter.257 It vacated and remanded
to the district court to make appropriate factual determinations concerning
249. 654 F.3d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
250. Id. at 993.
251. Id. at 996.
252. Id. at 995–96 (noting eBay’s comparison of patent to copyright and construing
eBay’s emphasis on “consistently reject[ing] invitations to replace traditional equitable
considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows [copyright infringement]”
as proof that the presumption of irreparable harm is improper under eBay (quoting eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006))); cf. supra note 231 and
accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s similar reasoning in Salinger).
253. Flexible Lifeline, 654 F.3d at 996 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987)); cf. supra notes 232, 247 and accompanying text (discussing the
identical reasoning of the Second Circuit in Salinger and the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 III).
254. Flexible Lifeline, 654 F.3d at 996–97 (detailing the Winter decision, which rejected
as “too lenient” the Ninth Circuit’s own holding requiring a possibility of irreparable harm
(quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008))). The Flexible
Lifeline court stated, “If our past standard . . . is ‘too lenient,’ then surely a standard which
presumes irreparable harm without requiring any showing at all is also ‘too lenient.’” Id. at
997; cf. supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s
identical reasoning in Salinger).
255. Flexible Lifeline, 654 F.3d at 994. The Ninth Circuit had previously held Winter’s
four-part test controlling for all preliminary injunctions. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v.
City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
256. Flexible Lifeline, 654 F.3d at 998.
257. Id. at 998–1000 (citing Perfect 10 III, 653 F.3d at 981; Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d
68, 74–79 (2d Cir. 2010); CoxCom, Inc. v. Chaffee, 536 F.3d 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2008);
Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007); 4
NIMMER, supra note 22, § 14.06[A][5]; William W. Schwarzer, A. Wallace Tashima &
James M. Wagstaffe, CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL, ¶¶ 13:58.25–26 (2011)).
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irreparable harm, and its emphatic disposal of the presumption of
irreparable harm could not ring more clearly.258
c. The Fourth Circuit
In Bethesda Softworks, L.L.C. v. Interplay Entertainment Corp., the
Fourth Circuit joined the Second and Ninth Circuits in declaring the
presumption of irreparable harm no longer applicable in copyright cases.259
There, the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendant
from infringing plaintiff’s copyrights in a video game series.260 The U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland denied the motion due to
plaintiff’s failure to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm.261 When the
plaintiff argued that irreparable harm may be presumed upon a showing of
likelihood of success on the merits, the Fourth Circuit held that in eBay, the
“Supreme Court declared such presumptions inappropriate.”262
The court found that eBay applies in the copyright context due to eBay’s
analogizing of the approach under the Patent Act to the Copyright Act’s
scheme.263 Further, the Fourth Circuit held that any differences between
permanent and preliminary injunctive relief are insufficient to warrant
applying the presumption to permanent, but not preliminary injunctions,
noting the Second and Ninth Circuits’ similar conclusions.264 Finally, the
court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the circuit’s statement in
Galloway, that “‘[i]rreparable injury often derives from the [intangible]
nature of copyright violations,’” supported a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable harm.265

258. Id. at 998 (likening the continued viability of the presumption to the catchphrase
“Elvis has left the building,” because the presumption was applied in Elvis Presley
Enterprises, Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th Cir. 2003)). In a humorous
footnote, the court cites a long description of the result, including: “‘the show’s over, the
curtain has fallen, the sun has set, that’s all she wrote, the fat lady has sung’” and concludes
that “[t]he same can be aptly said of the fate of the presumption of irreparable harm
described in Elvis Presley.” Id. at 998 n.5 (quoting Cecil Adams, “Elvis Has Left the
Building.” Who Said It First?, STRAIGHT DOPE (Dec. 27, 2002), http://straightdope.com/
columns/read/2430/elvis-has-left-the-building-who-said-it-first).
259. 2011 WL 5084587, No. 11-1860, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 2011) (per curiam) (“At
one time . . . this circuit, presumed irreparable harm in copyright cases once the plaintiff
established probable likelihood of success on the merits. . . . In 2006, the Supreme Court
declared such presumptions inappropriate.”).
260. Id. at *1.
261. Id.
262. Id. at *2.
263. Id.; see also supra note 146 and accompanying text.
264. Bethesda, 2011 WL 5084587, at *3 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 544–46 & n.12 (1987) and Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7,
24 (2008), for the proposition that “the same equitable principles undergird courts’ authority
in each posture”).
265. Id. (quoting Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 544
(4th Cir. 2007)) (explaining how such a reading of Galloway is “impermissibly broad” and
would “lead to the very presumption that eBay prohibits”); cf. supra note 173 and
accompanying text.
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3. The Federal Circuit Abandons the Presumption for Patent Injunctions
While every circuit to address the issue concluded that eBay and Winter
abrogated the presumption of irreparable harm as applied to copyright
injunctions, uncertainty remained concerning the Federal Circuit’s view of
the presumption in the patent context in light of its prior evasiveness on the
subject. 266 Confusion remained among lower courts: at least one district
court continued to doubt eBay’s rejection of the presumption as applied to
preliminary injunctions, 267 while another noted that “the presumption of
irreparable harm is at best on life support.”268 The Federal Circuit removed
all doubt in Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Manufacturing Corp., where it
declared that “eBay jettisoned the presumption of irreparable harm as it
applies to determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.”269 While
the court specifically abolished the presumption as applied to patent
infringement, the Federal Circuit’s language was broad and unqualified, and
stated agreement with the Second and Ninth circuits, which reached the
same conclusion with respect to copyright law. 270 Though it abandoned the
presumption, the Federal Circuit noted that it would still utilize the
patentee’s right to exclude as a useful, though not dispositive, tool in aiding
its determination of irreparable harm. 271
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT SHOULD REJECT THE PRESUMPTION
IN FUTURE COPYRIGHT CASES
As discussed in Part III, the Jacobsen decision contrasted with that of
every circuit to subsequently address the presumption’s existence in a posteBay world. 272 This included the Ninth Circuit, which overruled its own
longstanding presumption of irreparable harm, precedent that the Federal
Circuit had enforced in Jacobsen. 273 As the Federal Circuit is not bound by
the decisions of other circuits, 274 Jacobsen technically remains good law.
Yet its application of the presumption is likely moot, and the circuit split
previously alluded to does not properly exist; 275 if another copyright
injunction case were to come before the Federal Circuit from a district court

266. See supra notes 153–57 and accompanying text.
267. See Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 07-80435-CIV, 2009 WL 3855174, at
*13 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 17, 2009) (“[T]he presumption of irreparable harm in the context of
preliminary injunctions should survive eBay.”).
268. Red Bend Ltd. v. Google, Inc., No. 09-cv-11813, 2011 WL 1288503, at *18 (D.
Mass. Mar. 31, 2011).
269. Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
270. Id. at 1149; see also supra Part III.B.2.a–b.
271. See Robert Bosch, 659 F.3d at 1149–50 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
272. See supra Part III.B.2.
273. See supra notes 203, 248, 257 and accompanying text.
274. See Amerikohl Mining, Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1210, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(“[D]ecisions from other circuits are not binding on this court . . . .”); see also 21 C.J.S.
Courts § 210 (2006) (“[O]ne circuit is not bound by a decision of another . . . .”).
275. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
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in the Ninth Circuit, it would likely apply current Ninth Circuit law, require
proof of each of the four eBay factors, and reject any presumption of
irreparable harm. It is less clear, however, how the Federal Circuit would
apply regional circuit law where the regional circuit has not addressed
eBay’s effect on the copyright presumption.
This part first contends that although it may have been reasonable at the
time to do so, the Federal Circuit erroneously declined to apply eBay to
copyright preliminary injunctions in Jacobsen. It then urges the Federal
Circuit to reject the presumption in future copyright cases when the regional
circuit has not addressed the vitality of the presumption post-eBay. Finally,
it proposes that such a ruling rejecting the presumption is ideal because it
aligns with current case law and advances important policy goals.
A. The Jacobsen Court’s Error in Presuming Irreparable Harm After eBay
This section begins by addressing why it was justifiable at the time for
the Jacobsen court to apply the presumption of irreparable harm. First,
uncertainty reasonably existed as to the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the
presumption post-eBay, and second, eBay case law revealed conflicting
interpretations of eBay’s application to copyright preliminary injunctions.
Despite such apparent justifications, this section asserts that the Federal
Circuit’s application of the Ninth Circuit’s pre-eBay standard in Jacobsen
was erroneous, as eBay’s logic implicitly rejected the practice of presuming
irreparable harm upon a showing of probable success on the merits of a
copyright infringement claim. Had it applied eBay’s standards to the
preliminary injunction at hand, the Jacobsen court could have avoided the
application of a legal standard that would subsequently be overruled.
1. Rationales for the Jacobsen Court’s Failure to Apply eBay
The Federal Circuit was potentially justified in declining to apply the
eBay four-factor test to the copyright preliminary injunction motion at hand
in Jacobsen. First, Ninth Circuit law was unclear concerning eBay’s effect
on the presumption of irreparable harm as applied to copyright preliminary
injunctions. Second, the few district courts that addressed eBay’s relevance
to copyright preliminary injunctions reached conflicting conclusions,
providing the Federal Circuit with little persuasive authority to guide it. For
these reasons, it was not unreasonable for the Federal Circuit to predict that
the Ninth Circuit would not apply eBay to preliminary injunctions.
Nothing in the Federal Circuit’s enabling legislation (FCIA) restricts or,
conversely, requires the Federal Circuit to apply its own law to non-patent
matters. 276 The Jacobsen court, however, was bound by Federal Circuit
precedent requiring application of regional circuit law to non-patent issues,
precedent that originated from the policy goals of preventing intercircuit
conflicts 277 and avoiding self-appropriation of law not assigned to it.278
276. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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While the Federal Circuit has expanded the realm of its own law in the past,
this expansion has only been in the patent realm. 279 Even if the Federal
Circuit had ordered a rehearing en banc, 280 to apply its own law to a field
over which it has no subject matter jurisdiction over—the grant of a
preliminary injunction for copyright infringement—would be taking
Federal Circuit choice of law too far, as it would contradict congressional
intent to discourage Federal Circuit appropriation of law not specifically
assigned to it.281
Although required to apply Ninth Circuit law, this was unsettled at the
time of Jacobsen, as the Ninth Circuit had yet to address eBay’s effect on
its practice of presuming irreparable harm as applied to copyright
preliminary injunctions. 282 In such situations, Federal Circuit choice-oflaw precedent requires the court to “reasonably predict how [the regional
circuit] would decide the issue.” 283 It was reasonable for the Jacobsen
court to express uncertainty as to eBay’s effect on the presumption, and
therefore predict that the Ninth Circuit would not apply eBay in the
copyright preliminary injunction context. At the time of Jacobsen, the
Ninth Circuit had already addressed its standard for granting copyright
preliminary injunctions in one post-eBay case, Perfect 10 II. 284 There, the
Ninth Circuit applied its traditional two-part test, rather than eBay’s
principles, to a copyright preliminary injunction in a decision that did not
address eBay. 285 While Perfect 10 II did not address the presumption of
irreparable harm, 286 it was reasonable for the Federal Circuit to believe that
the Ninth Circuit considered eBay inapplicable to copyright preliminary
injunctions, due to the Perfect 10 II court’s failure to apply eBay’s
traditional equitable principles to such an analysis. If the eBay decision did
not apply, then the Ninth Circuit’s presumption standard remained intact.
Moreover, relevant eBay case law had reached inconsistent and
sometimes opposite conclusions regarding the status of the presumption.
Support for eBay’s abrogation of the presumption in the copyright
preliminary injunction context arose mainly from the Grokster court, which
noted that eBay had twice referenced Amoco, a case concerning a
preliminary injunction.287 No circuits had addressed eBay’s effect on the
presumption, 288 and the only circuits that addressed eBay in the copyright
Little
context applied eBay’s factors to permanent injunctions.289
agreement existed among district courts regarding eBay’s appropriate
279. See supra notes 65–74 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 46, 60 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
283. TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002); accord
Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575–76 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam).
284. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
285. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Part II.C.1.

2012]

IRREPARABLE HARM AND COPYRIGHT

2149

extension to copyright law, 290 even within the same district, 291 with many
concluding that eBay did not nullify the presumption as applied to
preliminary injunctive relief.292 Therefore, the Jacobsen court could not
clearly assess whether eBay had, in fact, eliminated the presumption from
the injunction analysis, or if its principles indeed extended to copyright
preliminary injunctive relief.
2. Why the Jacobsen Court Ultimately Erred in Presuming Harm
After eBay
Although there were reasonable procedural grounds for the Jacobsen
court’s failure to apply eBay to the copyright preliminary injunction at
hand, eBay’s logic directly opposed the presumption of irreparable harm as
applied to copyright injunctions. The Jacobsen court therefore erred in
employing the Ninth Circuit’s pre-eBay presumption, as eBay not only
abrogated the presumption in patent cases, but extended to the copyright
preliminary injunction context as well. Despite a mandatory adherence to
Ninth Circuit law, the Jacobsen court could have circumvented procedural
hurdles by construing unsettled Ninth Circuit law as rejecting the
presumption in light of eBay.
Although district courts were not unanimous on the issue at the time
Jacobsen was decided, 293 the eBay decision clearly rejected presuming
irreparable harm in the patent context. When determining the grant of
injunctive relief, eBay required courts to apply traditional equitable
principles, one of which involves proof of irreparable harm. 294 While many
courts had placed the burden on defendants to rebut the presumption, eBay
shifted the burden from defendants back to plaintiffs in holding that
plaintiffs “must demonstrate” the irreparable harm prong of the test.295 It is
thus inappropriate for courts to presume irreparable harm following
eBay. 296 Several district courts indeed came to this exact conclusion.297
eBay’s implicit rejection of the presumption is made clearer when one
considers the Supreme Court’s language in Amoco that the “presumption is
contrary to traditional equitable principles.” 298 As eBay specifically held
that traditional equitable principles apply equally to patent disputes,299 it is
evident that eBay abrogated the presumption of irreparable harm with
respect to patent law.
eBay’s logic also extended beyond patent law and permanent injunctions
to the realm of copyright law and preliminary injunctions. The eBay Court

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra text accompanying note 140.
See supra text accompanying note 140.
See supra text accompanying note 140.
See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987).
See supra notes 133, 141–42, 147 and accompanying text.
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spent a significant portion of its decision comparing patent to copyright
law.300 It noted that both areas of law grant holders a fundamental right to
exclude for a limited time, and that both permit courts to grant injunctions
according to traditional equitable principles as they deem reasonable.301
The eBay Court also pointed to prior copyright decisions to demonstrate
consistent rejection of the rule that an injunction automatically follows a
finding of infringement.302 Further, in emphasizing that courts should
exercise discretion consistent with traditional equitable principles “in patent
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards,”303 the
Court clearly refused to limit its ruling to patent law, and extended it to any
dispute governed by traditional equitable principles—of which copyright
aptly applies.304 Notably, the only three circuits to have squarely addressed
eBay’s application to copyright at the time of the Jacobsen decision—the
First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits—had already adopted the position that
the eBay factors applied in the copyright context, albeit to permanent
injunctive relief.305
Given the fact that the eBay Court cited Amoco, a preliminary injunction
case where the Court stated that permanent and preliminary injunction
standards were basically identical,306 as support for its four-factor test,307
eBay was clearly applicable to preliminary injunctive relief as well.308
Ninth Circuit law holds that when prior circuit authority is irreconcilable
with intervening higher authority, the circuit is bound by the higher
authority.309 Thus, the Jacobsen court should have construed eBay as
abolishing the Ninth Circuit’s presumption standard, and reasonably
predicted that the Ninth Circuit would overrule the copyright presumption
once it addressed eBay’s effect on the standard—as the Ninth Circuit in fact
later did.310 For all of these reasons, in conjunction with the fact that a
Ninth Circuit district court had recently advocated eBay’s application to
preliminary injunctions in Grokster,311 Jacobsen’s failure to apply eBay
was erroneous, and the court could have ultimately avoided the adoption of
a legal standard that was subsequently overruled.

300. See supra notes 144–46 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
303. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
304. See supra note 145 (comparing patent and copyright law’s similar standards for
granting injunctive relief); accord supra note 230 and accompanying text (citing the Second
Circuit’s similar reasoning in Salinger).
305. See supra Part II.C.1.
306. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 139–40 and accompanying text.
308. Cf. supra notes 232, 247, 253 and accompanying text (noting the similar reasoning
of the Second and Ninth Circuits).
309. See supra note 240 and accompanying text; see also supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
310. See supra Part III.B.2(b).
311. See supra notes 62, 179–86 and accompanying text (explaining how unsettled
regional circuit law should be discerned in light of district court decisions in that circuit).
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B. The Federal Circuit Should Construe Unsettled Regional Law
as Applying eBay to Copyright Preliminary Injunctions
While eBay’s effect on the presumption of irreparable harm, and its
application to copyright preliminary injunctions in particular, was
ambiguous among the lower courts when the Federal Circuit decided
Jacobsen, the passage of time has provided much needed clarity. It is
possible that a case involving the grant of a preliminary injunction for
copyright infringement may once again find its way to the Federal Circuit,
in conjunction with a patent claim.312 If this appeal is from a district court
where the circuit presumed irreparable harm before eBay, but has not yet
addressed whether eBay has eliminated this presumption,313 the Federal
Circuit should not mechanically apply outdated pre-eBay precedent in the
name of strict adherence to regional law. Rather, in discerning regional
circuit law where it is unclear, the Federal Circuit should predict that these
circuits would hold that eBay abrogated the presumption. This section
assesses how such a ruling would align with recent case law and advance
important policy goals.
1. Harmonizing with Recent Case Law
As the Federal Circuit must apply regional circuit law in addressing the
presumption’s post-eBay vitality,314 it may reasonably predict that these
circuits will eliminate the presumption upon addressing the issue. This is
because the uncertainty among courts regarding eBay’s application to
copyright preliminary injunctions, although present when Jacobsen was
decided,315 has ceased to exist.
In Winter, the Supreme Court eliminated much of this uncertainty by
confirming that eBay applied to preliminary injunctions. First, the Court
applied the same traditional equitable principles set forth in eBay to
preliminary injunctions: it reaffirmed the traditional equitable principles as
applicable to preliminary injunctions, holding that courts must determine a
likelihood of irreparable harm, balance the competing parties’ claims of
injury, and consider the public interest when granting a preliminary
312. See supra notes 36–48 and accompanying text.
313. These circuits include the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits. The Second, Ninth, and Fourth Circuits have explicitly rejected the presumption as
it applies to copyright preliminary injunctions. See supra Part III.B.2. The Fifth Circuit
expressly rejected the presumption before eBay, and the D.C. Circuit has never expressly
adopted it. See supra note 107. While the First and Eleventh Circuits have applied eBay to
permanent injunctive relief, see supra Part II.C.1, these circuits have yet to specifically
address eBay’s effect on the presumption of harm for preliminary injunctions, see supra note
173 and accompanying text.
314. As discussed in Part IV.B.2, infra, precedent requires application of regional circuit
law to copyright claims, and overruling such precedent en banc would cut against
congressional intent by causing Federal Circuit appropriation of law not exclusively assigned
to it. If the Federal Circuit could apply its own law to copyright matters, it would most
likely reject the presumption, as it recently confirmed that “eBay jettisoned the presumption
of irreparable harm as it applies . . . to injunctive relief.” Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg.
Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
315. See supra Part IV.A.2.
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injunction.316 Second, the Court emphasized that preliminary injunctive
relief is an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”317 This
analysis mirrored eBay’s rejection of categorical rules permitting
injunctions to automatically follow findings of infringement.318 Finally, the
Court more overtly disapproved of the presumption of irreparable harm in
the preliminary injunction context by clearly placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff to show that “irreparable injury is likely.”319 If issuance of a
preliminary injunction based on a possibility of irreparable harm was too
lenient for the Supreme Court,320 then it logically follows that issuing an
injunction upon a presumption of irreparable harm is even less consistent
with the extraordinary nature of such relief.321
Additionally, all circuits that have spoken on the vitality of the copyright
presumption of irreparable harm in a post-eBay world have emphatically
rejected it in the context of preliminary injunctions.322 The Second and
Ninth Circuits have specifically held that eBay and Winter abrogated this
presumption, and effectively overruled their precedents.323 The Fourth
Circuit also found the presumption inappropriate in light of eBay.324 The
Second and Ninth Circuits’ abandonment of the presumption is particularly
significant, due to the prominence of these circuits in promulgating
copyright doctrine.325 In predicting that circuits that have not yet addressed
the presumption’s post-eBay vitality would reject the presumption as
inconsistent with eBay and Winter, the Federal Circuit would not only
harmonize with all circuits that have addressed the issue, but would be in
accord with the most important circuits in the field.
2. Advancing Public Policy
For purposes of discerning regional law, the Federal Circuit has stated
that if the regional circuit has not directly addressed an issue, it must predict
the applicable regional law in light of public policy considerations.326
Several policies would be advanced if the Federal Circuit interpreted
unsettled circuit law to reject the presumption of irreparable harm in
copyright preliminary injunction cases after eBay and Winter. These
include the efficient utilization of court resources, the avoidance of

316. See supra text accompanying note 214. The factor of likelihood of success on the
merits is not pertinent to a determination of permanent injunctive relief because at that point,
the plaintiff has already established success. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
317. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
318. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
319. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22; see also supra text accompanying notes 210–12.
320. See supra text accompanying notes 211–12.
321. The Ninth Circuit notably reiterated this argument in Flexible Lifeline. See supra
note 254 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part III.B.2.
323. See supra notes 235, 240, 256 and accompanying text.
324. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
326. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1575–76 (Fed. Cir.
1984); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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intercircuit conflict, and preservation of the extraordinary nature of the
preliminary injunction.
First, such application promotes an efficient use of court resources.
Intervening Supreme Court law, which is controlling precedent, binds the
circuits that have yet to address whether the presumption survives eBay.327
As it is now clear that eBay and Winter are inconsistent with the
presumption of irreparable harm in the copyright context, 328 the Federal
Circuit should presume that unsettled circuits would reject the presumption
once they are in a position to address the issue. Otherwise, the Federal
Circuit would inefficiently utilize court resources by failing to apply
intervening and controlling Supreme Court precedent that the regional
circuit would be required to enforce subsequently. 329
Interpreting regional circuit law in this way also implements the Federal
Circuit’s choice-of-law policy to avoid intercircuit conflicts in non-patent
areas. 330 If the Federal Circuit were to apply, for example, the Third or
Sixth Circuit’s pre-eBay presumption of irreparable harm upon a showing
of prima facie copyright infringement, it would conflict with all circuits—
the Second, Ninth, and Fourth—that have ruled on the issue post-eBay. 331
Such a ruling would not aggravate existing intercircuit conflict on the issue,
but instead would create a wholly new intercircuit conflict where
application of outdated regional law is reaffirmed in sharp contrast with the
current law of other circuits. While Congress never required the Federal
Circuit to clear up intercircuit conflict,332 it likely never intended that the
circuit create such conflict either. Additionally, in applying at least Eighth
and Tenth Circuit law, ruling that the copyright presumption is inconsistent
with eBay and Winter would also advance circuit policy that a sister
circuit’s decision deserves to be given great weight and precedential
value. 333
Finally, aside from implementing congressional intent, perhaps the most
important policy reason for abolishing the presumption as applied to
copyright preliminary injunctions follows from the nature of the record at
the preliminary injunction stage.
Preliminary injunctive relief has
historically been viewed as an extraordinary remedy that courts should
never award automatically, 334 and one which wields incredible power, as it
often results in the end of litigation. 335 Presuming irreparable harm, the

327. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
328. See supra Part IV.A.1.
329. See United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5 (1993) (“We hold that the Court of
Appeals was wrong in refusing to recognize that this case was controlled by our
opinion . . . rather than by its previous opinion . . . .”).
330. See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
333. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 210. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits adhere to this policy.
See, e.g., Wedelstedt v. Wiley, 477 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Miller, 276 F.3d
424, 428–29 (8th Cir. 2002).
334. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
335. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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most important factor of the injunction analysis,336 upon a mere showing of
probable success of infringement thus runs counter to the nature of the
preliminary injunction, and can lead to the over-issuance of a remedy that
should not be granted unless the plaintiff, “by a clear showing, carries the
burden of persuasion.”337 Additionally, as the factual record is often
incomplete at this stage in the proceedings, the court may issue erroneous
findings regarding a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits.338
Presuming irreparable harm in such cases could lead to the erroneous grant
of preliminary injunctions, opposing the “familiar law that injunctions will
not issue to enforce a right that is doubtful.”339 Therefore, there is danger
in presuming that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm upon a finding
that the plaintiff will likely succeed on its infringement claim when this
finding is made on an incomplete record without the benefit of a full trial to
ascertain the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. Requiring the plaintiff to prove
irreparable harm is merely another safeguard against the erroneous grant of
such an important, and indeed extraordinary, remedy.
CONCLUSION
The eBay v. MercExchange decision is clearly inconsistent with the
formerly common judicial practice of presuming irreparable harm once a
plaintiff proves a likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright
infringement claim. The Federal Circuit in Jacobsen v. Katzer therefore
erred in enforcing the Ninth Circuit’s pre-eBay presumption of irreparable
harm upon a showing of prima facie infringement, and in failing to hold
that eBay abrogated this presumption in the copyright preliminary
injunction context. While Jacobsen’s failure to apply eBay at the time was
justifiable in light of difficulty perceiving Ninth Circuit law concerning
eBay’s effect on the presumption, as well as inconsistent eBay case law that
revealed conflicting interpretations as to eBay’s application, such
justifications are no longer valid. The last four years have confirmed the
death of the presumption of irreparable harm as applied to copyright
preliminary injunctions. This progression away from the presumption
began with the Supreme Court’s application of eBay’s principles to
preliminary injunctions in Winter, continued with circuits’ consistent
rulings that eBay indeed abolished the presumption, and was reinforced by
the Federal Circuit’s own explicit abandonment of the presumption in the
patent context.
Therefore, it is evident that if the Federal Circuit is again faced with a
copyright preliminary injunction motion from a circuit that has not
addressed the continuing vitality of the presumption post-eBay, the Federal
Circuit should not mechanically apply the regional circuit’s pre-eBay
336. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
337. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997); see also supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.
339. Consol. Canal Co. v. Mesa Canal Co., 117 U.S. 296, 301 (1900); see also supra note
88 and accompanying text.
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practice of presuming irreparable harm upon a finding of prima facie
infringement. Rather, the court should construe such unsettled law by
predicting that the circuit would abandon the presumption as inconsistent
with eBay and Winter. This ruling will harmonize with the law of all
circuits that have spoken on the issue—including the leading copyright
circuits—and will advance the important public policies of efficiently
utilizing court resources and avoiding intercircuit conflict. Perhaps most
significantly, in holding that the presumption as applied to copyright
preliminary injunctions does not survive eBay, the Federal Circuit will aid
in safeguarding the extraordinary nature of this remedy from excessive
grants by requiring adherence to the traditional equitable principles that
courts have espoused since injunctions’ origins in equity.

